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FACTORS IN THE CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS:
STRUCTURAL AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPEDIMENTS
DORIS JEAN CUBBERNUSS
Western Michigan University, 1982

The extent to which corporate power, in and of itself, is con
sidered a problem in U.S. society is a function of the perceived
role of the corporation in social, political, and economic struc
tures.

Recognition of the inordinate powers of large corporations

in the social and political, as well as economic, institutions of
the society serves as an impetus for the analysis of the structures
and processes designed to control corporate activities.

The struc

tural and bureaucratic impediments to these control mechanisms are
illustrated in the Ford Pinto case.

The activities of the Ford

Motor Company, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
and judicial bodies provide the forum in which interrelationships
among controlling bodies and the organizations to be controlled are
addressed.

Furthermore, the related issues of legitimacy of cor

porate and controlling powers, the role of the state in the economic
sphere, and the role of economic organizations in the political
sphere are explored within a model of society that allows recognition
of major power differentials and the harm that may come from them.
In this research, the mechanisms designed for the control of
corporations are examined for their contributions toward the social
responsibility of large corporations.

The reinforcements and con-
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tradictions in the network of control agencies are explicated and
the effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism in the Ford case is
assessed.

The delineation of obstacles to the control of corporate

actions within the case study afforded by the criminal prosecution
and federal regulation of the Ford Motor Company illuminate politi
cal/economic and organizational relations in our society.

While

support is found for the view that power differentials are, to some
extent, mitigated in the structure and processes of interactions
between corporations and their controllers, this case study illus
trates the form and extent of the advantages associated with corpo
rate actors in these processes.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

The large organizations that exist in the institutional arrange
ments of U.S. society are social actors that maintain access to
power beyond that of individuals within the society.

Nowhere is the

unequal power of organizational actors more evident than in the
large corporations that dominate the economic, social, and political
arrangements in U.S. society.

The differential ability of the cor

poration to influence societal definitions, the content of social,
political, and economic norms, and the legal processes designed to
control the powers of large complex organizations in the society are
examined in this study.

The problem is two-fold:

the form, extent,

and"bases of the extraordinary powers of the large corporation and
the structural and bureaucratic impediments to the control of these
powers by other groups and organizations in the society.
The pervasive influence of large corporations in the economic
sector is discussed by Parenti (1977):
The giant corporations control the rate of tech
nological development and the terms of production;
they fix prices and determine the availability of
livelihood; they decide which labor markets to ex
plore and which to abandon; they create new standards
of consumption and decide the quality of goods and
services...(pp. 20-21).
Corporate power is not limited to economic influence.

Many social

scientists have viewed large corporations as political systems and
social enterprises.

These conceptions of large corporations as so1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cial and political, as well as economic, enterprises emphasizes
the extraordinary power that corporations wield over other actors,
including individuals, in the society.

In Galbraith's (1973) view,

"The great corporation exercises public power, power that affects the
health, well-being, and general happiness of those subject to it"
(p. 6).
Public power wielded by corporate actors in the private sector
of the economy may require external controls to assure responsive
ness of that power to the needs and interests of people in the
society.

"There is no reason to believe that, except by accident,

the exercise of public power by the corporation coincides with the
public interest" (Galbraith, 1973, p. 6).

The conception of the

corporation as a public actor does not negate the very real cir
cumstance of private ownership and control over the goals, resources,
and decision-making processes of the large corporations.

The danger

of such a situation is evident in the costs society has suffered,
costs that include harm to the physical well-being of individual
members of our society, to the economic well-being of the organiza
tional and individual actors in our economy, and to the social and
emotional well-being of all members of the society.

Deaths and in

juries due to occupational hazards and product defects, the economic
repercussions of unfair advertising and market practices, and the
threats to personal quality of life accompanying the business deci
sions of large businesses in the maintenance of a viable labor force
exemplify these costs (Schrager & Short, 1978; Dahl, 1973).
The primary focus of this research, the control of corporations,
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examines structural and organizational responses to corporate power
and the issues that underlie such processes.

Attempts to control

corporations have focused on regulatory structures, criminal
liability, civil liability, the maintenance of organizations which
serve as countervailing threats to corporate power, the maintenance
of competition among firms, and strategies designed to directly in
tervene in the decision-making processes of large corporations.

The

control of large organizations such as corporations presents special
problems to policy-makers in their attempts to curb the power and in
fluence of large corporations and to social scientists attempting
to construct general theories of social control.

Ermann and Lundman

(1978) emphasize the necessity of specific attention to the or
ganizational features of the actors to be controlled.

The problem of

corporate power and its control constitute the two major foci of this
research.

The Problem of Corporate Power

An understanding of the position of corporations in U.S. socie
ty requires attention to the historical development of the corpora
tion as an acting social entity (Coleman, 1978; Fisse, 1980, Gross,
1980; Haworth, 1959).

In the view of the corporation expressed by

Galbraith (1973), it is a social actor with a public character and
the power to control social and political institutional arrangements
as well as economic ones.

The dimensions of corporate power, while

often alluded to, have not been explored fully.

Attention to the

ramifications of organizational actions is required for an under
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standing of the power of corporations.

The unequal power arrange

ments existing because of the presence of corporate actors are, in
and of themselves, problematic.

The lack of public review of the

policies generated by what are often treated as private systems of
power presents a dilemma for the social scientist, the voter, and
the policy-maker.

The problems are underscored when the corporate

actor misuses the power it commands.

The misconduct of corpora

tions and the ill effects of such misconduct are essential considera
tions in the study of corporate power.

The examination of corporate

power, corporate misconduct, and corporate responsibilities are
necessary for examination of the social control of these corporate
organizations.

Toward that end, the historical development of the

corporate actor, the dimensions of corporate power, and the relation
ship between corporate power and corporate misconduct are examined.

Historical Development of the Corporate Actor

The transformation of the corporation from a passive repository
of rights and privileges into a powerful economic actor parallels
the growth of industry and the development of.the capitalist economic
system (Clinard & Yeager, 1980).

As the requirements of the economic

system grew and changed, so did the character and functions of the
entities within it.

Exploration of new territories, exploitation

of new resources, and distribution of new products required struc
tures and processes that superseded individual capitalists.
Coleman (1978) traces the roots of the modem corporation to
the middle ages and the legal constructions which held the privileges
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and properties granted by land owners and political figures.

These

legal constructions allowed recognition of the corporation as a
juristic person.

Since the corporation, even in its passive form,

consisted of a collection of positions, rather than persons, its
form provided an enduring institutionalized means by which these
rights and privileges could be held and administered.
The corporation as a trading and risk-sharing actor evolved from
these early passive entities.

In 1612, the development of the East

India Company provided for corporate management of funds invested
in exploration and marked the beginning of active corporate or
ganizational forms (Elkins, 1976; Stone, 1975).

Such corporate

forms, however, conflicted with other social forces, among them a
spirit of individualism, that resulted for a time in a world-wide
legal prohibition of the formation of business corporations (Chayes,
1961).

Bases for opposition to the corporate form in America in-

eluded the special privileges granted to it by sovereigns’
.

*

In keep

ing with the egalitarian spirit of 19th century America, the concept
of the corporation as a juristic person allowed it all of the rights
of individuals in the society but none of the special privileges
historically associated with incorporation.

"As a legal person it

was qualified to bear all the rights with which an age of individu
alism generously clothed persons of flesh and blood" (Chayes, 1961,
p. v).

Such a conception has two implications for contemporary con

trol of the corporate enterprise:

(1) the rights of the corpora

tion to operate without restraint are tied to the freedoms of in
dividuals and may be theoretically justified on that basis and
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(2) the control of incorporations has traditionally remained outside
of the federal government, since a source of early distrust of the
corporate form was its links to the properties and ruling classes of
Western European societies.

The maintenance of a system of state,

rather than federal, incorporation continues to be a factor in the
control of corporations, since state incorporation results in com
petition "to the lowest common denominator" (Nader, 1973).

Objec

tions to corporations in the 19th century were not limited solely to
their forms and methods of incorporation.

Dudden (1957) points out

that corporations, as acting social entities, engaged in business
practices that were seen as oppressive to many of the individual ac
tors who competed against them in the marketplace.

The success of

these practices resulted in concentrations of wealth and power in the
hands of corporate management, often with the help of government
policies that protected or favored the corporate actor..
Despite the grievances cited by Dudden (1973) against corpora
tions in the 19th century, Best and Connolly (1976) describe them as
"small, one-product, geographically bounded, owner-managed firms
operating in competitive markets" (p. 47).

In tracing the develop

ment of the corporate form in the 20th century, they cite the de
velopment of the "monopolistic, corporate giant (Best & Connolly, 1976,
p. 46) and the "emergence of the state as a dominant force in shaping
economic expansion" (p. 46) as major upheavals in the political
economy of the U.S.

Although the problems of corporate power in 19th

century America foreshadowed those of the 20th century, they pale by
comparison.

Nelson (1959) attributes the extraordinary growth of
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corporations to merger activity in the 20th century.

The growth of

corporations through these mergers allowed the concentration of huge
resources, transforming the relatively small corporations of the 19th
century into giant enterprises which dominate the economic struc
tures in which they perform (Best-& Connolly, 1976).

Clinard and

Yeager (1980) distinguish between mergers of companies with related
product lines, which increase the predictability of the market and,
therefore, the economic power of the firm, and conglomeration, which
allows corporations to amass extensive resources and capital and to
more effectively control economic, social, and political processes.
According to Clinard and Yeager (1980), the characteristics of the
corporation in the 20th century, including complex hierarchical struc
ture, profit and growth goals, and control by management, support
the effectiveness of the corporation in the control of these pro
cesses, since they undermine the development of a corporate conscience
(which would be consistent with the juristic person concept) and
institutionalization of external mechanisms for the control of cor
porations (in response to the organizational form of the corporation).

Dimensions of Corporate Power

The extent to which corporate power, in and of itself, is con
sidered a problem in U.S. society is a function of the perceived
role of the corporation in social, political, and economic structures.
Epstein (1969) and Drucker (1964), for example, recognize the in
ordinate power of the corporate organization in social and political
structures but accept that power as a legitimate corollary to the
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economic role of the corporation in society.

Others, among them

Nader and Green (1973), Galbraith (1973), and Gmchy (1979), do not
accept the legitimacy of the large corporation as a social and
political actor and call for controls on the ability of the cor
poration to influence economic and non-economic institutions in
society.

Still others view the corporation as primarily an economic

organization and deny the effects of the corporate actor on social
and political life (Jacoby, 1977).

One major consideration, then,

in the definition of corporate power as a problem in society is the
degree to which that power is seen as legitimate.

A second major

consideration is the extent to which corporations exercise different
types of power, each of which may be examined within the issue of
legitimacy.

A third consideration is the relationship between the

dimensions of corporate power and the extent to which the various
aspects and arenas of corporate power reinforce each other, whether
or not that power is legitimated by society.

A fourth consideration

is the structure of corporate characteristics that allow the effec
tive utilization of corporate powers, irrespective of their legiti
macy.

The Legitimacy of Corporate Power

Yankelovich (1977) proposes three sources of legitimacy for
institutional power:

(1) ideological legitimacy, (2) functional

legitimacy, and (3) moral legitimacy.

Ideological legitimacy de

rives from a system of abstract ideas, for example, the concept of
the welfare state, private property, or free enterprise, that provide
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the framework within which the institutions operate to meet the
needs of the society.

Functional legitimacy reflects the success

of the institution in meeting society's needs.

Moral legitimacy

is dependent upon the degree to which the institution operates ac
cording to basic precepts for behavior in the society.

The corporate

structure forms an enduring, integral part of the economic institu
tion of U.S. society.

The legitimacy of corporate power, as an

institutionalized power, may be examined within Yankelovich's (1977)
framework.

While any one of these sources may serve to legitimate

the power of corporations within the economic institution of society,
each may also provide a focus of attack on the overall legitimacy of
the corporate actor.
Yankelovich's (1977) trichotomy requires attention to the system
of abstract ideas that guide actors in societal institutions, the
criteria by which the success of particular actors within the insti
tutions may be judged, and the ground rules by which activities may
be defined as moral.

The assumptions underlying the organization

of society and the social processes by which decisions are made,
values are expressed, and agreements are reached affect the validity
of the criteria established for the legitimacy of societal institu
tions and the actors within them.

These underlying assumptions

serve to distinguish the functionalist and conflict paradigms as
well as authors in the field who attack, ignore, or defend the power
of large corporations on the basis of legitimacy.
The primary differences between the functionalist and conflict
.explanations of social behavior may be found in their basic assump-
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tions of society.

The functionalist explanation is based on the

assumptions that society is a lasting social system, it is well in
tegrated, every element within the society has a function, and that
society rests on a general consensus of its members.

The conflict

view is based on the assumptions that social change and social
conflict are ubiquitous, every element in society contributes to
change, and every society rests upon the constraint of some members
by others (Dahrendorf, 1958).
The controversy between these two approaches takes on paradig
matic dimensions.

Kuhn (1962) developed the notion that knowledge

does not grow in a linear fashion but, rather, grows as theoretical
revolutions occur within a science.

Ritzer (1975) has applied and

elaborated upon Kuhn's ideas ■within the field of sociology.

Ac

cording to Ritzer (1975), a paradigm is:
...a fundamental image of the subj ect matter within a
science. It serves to define what should be studied,
what questions should be asked, and what- rules should
be followed in interpreting the answers obtained
(p. 7).
A paradigm dispute occurs when the fundamental image of a subject
matter changes.

The dispute between functionalism and conflict has

reached that point.

In the functionalist approach, society is

examined in terms of social order and shared values.

The fundamental

image of the conflict approach is one of interest groups, differen
tial power, and constraint of societal members.

The assumptions

of each position prevent effective communication between the two
positions, since proponents of each view study different phenomena
which may be viewed as irrelevant by proponents of the opposing view.
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An underlying issue of the paradigm dispute within the social
sciences is the place of values.
cerned with values.

Sociologists have long been con

Historically, European sociologists, with the

notable exception of Marx, were rather scientific; that is, know
ledge came first and meliorism was secondary, if not peripheral.
With the rise of functionalist thought and its emphasis on consensus,
sociologists adopted a more "scientific" orientation to their dis
cipline.

In this view, the sociologist could be an objective ob

server and isolate himself/herself from the society under observa
tion.

As Gouldner (1964) put is, "Seemingly subordinating his own

claims to personal priority, in apparent conformity to a higher,
selfless principle, the theorist puts himself forward modestly, as
a discoverer of consensus rather than an originator of ideas (p. 17).
Objectivity and value-freedom were, (and, indeed, still are) asso
ciated with sociology for decades.

In the early sixties, the

value-free position again became an issue of discussion.

Many

theorists (for examples, Becker, 1967; Friedrichs, 1970; Gouldner,
1970) began questioning the ability of sociologists to be valuefree.

There is still a controversy concerning the place of values

within the social sciences.
Value-free sociologists maintain that they, like other scien
tists, can isolate values from their research.

The one value

such

scientists pursue is science (Rose, 1965, p. 425) and the ultimate
goal of science is truth.

Thus, in their view, sociologists are

truth-seekers who are immune from or able to put aside value-orientations.

From this viewpoint, one's personal orientations and
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beliefs and the societal context.can be overcome when pursuing truth
through the practice of science.
Opponents of this view see value-freedom as a myth (Gouldner,
1964) and argue that sociologists are influenced by personal pre
ferences and biases in all aspects of their work.

Nicolaus (1970)

argues that there never has been "...obj ective seeking-out of so
cial truth or reality...the eyes of the sociologists...have always
been turned downwards, and their palms upwards" (p. 275).

Nicolaus

(1970) says that social scientists have traditionally studied the
lower (subordinate) classes (thus, the "eyes down"), and have found
financial benefit from the upper (superordinate) classes.

Nicolaus

(1970) says that this must, of necessity, involve values.

Becker

(1967) states that it is impossible for sociologists to do research
without involving personal sympathies.

He advocates explicit sup

port for subordinates.
Is it possible to separate ideas from values?

Marx believed

that ideas are closely related to the relations of economic life.
He saw ideas as transitory (Coser, 1971) and placed them within
an historical context.

Ideas, according to Marx, "...are the re

flection, direct or sublimated, of the material interests that impel
men in their dealings with others" (Coser, 1971, p. 45).

In de

veloping a sociology of knowledge, Marx tied the ideas of a society
to the social roles and social classes within the society and po
sited that the economic infrastructure of the society is the ul
timate determinant of the particular societal superstructure.

The

societal superstructure consists of the values, ideas, and culture
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of the particular society.

Ideas, too, in his view, are based on

the infrastructure of the society.

The ideas of different socie

ties vary according to the differential infrastructure; a capitalist
society develops quite different ideas than a socialist one.
is extremely important in the development of knowledge.

This

Knowledge,

from this perspective, is not a reality "out there" but, rather, a
dynamic process which changes as societal infrastructures change.
Friedrichs (1970) discusses the return to Marxism in the sixties and
says, "... the graduate generation of the sixties tended to see it
self in humanistic terms rather than simply in the value-free gar
ments that had come to be associated with the behavioral sciences"
(p. 34).

Friedrichs goes on to describe the resultant conflict with

in sociology as a paradigm clash between the priestly paradigm which
advocates the objective viewing and determining of social reality,
and the prophetic paradigm which includes an "awareness of the
value-laden choices and implicit commitments" (Friedrichs, 1970, p.
292) of the sociologists.
Inherent in the functionalist paradigm is general acceptance
of the existing social, political, and economic arrangements.

Al

though differing interests and values of various groups may be
recognized within this paradigm, the existence of mechanisms for
dispute settlement is inherent in the functionalist perceptions of
social organization.

Change can and should occur gradually to

allow for adjustment by the system to disturbances in the social
organization.

Within this framework, the ideological legitimacy

of corporate power is assumed for there is agreement on the basic
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institutional arrangements in which the corporation operates.

The

establishment of the functional and moral legitimacy of corporate
power is at issue, however.

Dissatisfaction with corporate

performance, either in terms of functional criteria or moral cri
teria, may result from (1) disagreement on the criteria established
for evaluation or (2) criticism of the corporation for failure to
meet the established criteria.
In the conflict paradigm, the social order is assumed to rest
on the coercion of some members by other members; the social order
is, therefore, always subject to change.

The ideological legitimacy

of corporate power, since it rests on coercion, is always suspect.
Functional and moral legitimacy are also problematic.

In addition

to the problems specified within the functionalist paradigm, a
further consideration is emphasized within the conflict paradigm.
Given the unequal power arrangements, a suitable arena for the fair
settlement of disputes is unlikely to exist.

If coercion is the

mechanism by which disputes are settled, corporate actors may have
the advantage of defining the criteria by which they, themselves,
are legitimated.
Power as a Multi-Dimensional Construct

The problem of the legitimacy of corporate power may be clari
fied by attention to a classification of corporate powers.
McConnell (1967) does not define the general concept of power but
provides a typology of corporate powers as a means by which to bet
ter understand this "conception of much ambiguity and imprecision"
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(p. 248).

In so doing, he raises a number of issues germane to

the problem of legitimacy of corporate power.

The influence of cor

porations over prices in the market, the influence of corporations
over the economic structure, the influence of corporations over the
quality of life in U.S. society, and the influence of corporations
over the policies of government are essential elements in the market,
economic, social, and political powers of the U.S.

Tied very closely

to these issues of power are those of cohesion and autonomy.

The

extent to which corporations form a cohesive group with elite in
terests and the extent to which corporations are beyond the control
of other members of society are important considerations in the
analysis of corporate power.
Although there is widespread agreement that corporate power ex
tends beyond market and economic powers (Graham, 1980; Green, 1973;
Shover, 1980; Stone, 1975; Swartz, 1978), the legitimacy of extraeconomic powers of corporations is debated.

Epstein (1969), Monsen

(1973), and Steiner (1977) support the extension of corporate power
beyond the economic sphere.

Galbraith (1973) and Dahl (1973) call

for explicit recognition of the corporation as a social and politi
cal organization and advocate the limitation of the activities of
corporations in these areas.

Yoder (1978) and Elkins (1976) sug

gest, under certain conditions, limiting the power of large cor
porations to do business.

Viewed only as economic enterprises, cor

porations may or may not meet the ideological, functional, and moral
criteria of legitimacy; at any rate, the corporate status, granted
through charters, allows explicit recognition of the corporation as
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an economic enterprise.

Attention to corporate power, however, can

no longer be focused entirely on the economic ramifications of that
power.

Recognition of the corporation as a social enterprise and

political system is necessary for serious consideration of the le
gitimacy of corporate power.

In this research, the political and so

cial powers of one corporation are addressed and the context in which
they are wielded is described.

The legitimacy of corporate powers

may not be automatically assumed or denied; public examination of
the goals and practices of the large, complex corporations of U.S.
society is necessary.

The Relationships Between Corporate Powers

The distinctions made by McConnell (1967) between the forms of
corporate power do not negate the inter-relationships and inter
dependence between these various forms.

Harris (1973) discusses the

mechanisms for the translation of corporate economic power into cor
porate political power.

Corporations rely on campaign contributions,

advertising, direct lobbying, and govemment-business job exchanges
to ensure their political power (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Harris,
1973).

Campaign contributions open channels of communication be

tween the donor and the recipient.

They are so essential to the

political power of corporations that various practices have been de
veloped to circumvent the laws passed to control them.

The utiliza

tion of improper bookkeeping practices and contribution of corporate
funds through individual corporate executives are two such practices
(Clinard & Yeager, 1980).

Advertising is not restricted to product

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

information and is seen by Harris as a tool for political persuasion.
Corporations may present a view of public issues favorable to their
operations through the advertising media.

The successful utiliza

tion of the media is cited by Harris in the delay in federal re
quirements for air bag installation in automobiles.

Like campaign

contributions and political advertising, lobbying provides a means
for transforming economic power into political power.

A final me

chanism cited by Harris is the interchange between government and
business positions.

The political power of corporations is enhanced

by their positions as employers, or potential employers, of ad
ministrators in the federal government and by the utilization of
business personnel

in government positions; these situations allow

business interests an advantage in influencing the political institu
tion (Burnham, 1975; Jensen, 1972; McConnell, 1976).

As a result of

the relationship between the economic power and political power of
corporations, they are able to use the political institution to
further their private economic goals (Harris, 1973).

The social

power of corporations, that is, the ability of corporations to af
fect the quality of life in society, is also linked to their economic
and political powers.

Green (1973) cites lenient tax structures,

strategic philanthropic activities, absentee owners, and national
banking practices for the ill effects corporations have on the
quality of life in communities supporting industrial firms.

These

ill effects include an exacerbation of the problems of industrial
pollution, tax burdens for individuals, community dependence, and
discrimination.

Shover (1980), in his examination of the coal in-
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dustry, reveals the ability of large mining companies to socialize
the harmful costs of mining, passing the costs on to the federal
government and the consumer.

The abilities of corporations to in

fluence consumption practices, to articulate and perpetuate an
ideology favorable to corporate goals, to control employment levels,
and to construct policies for interactions with foreign governments
are indications of the overlap between the social and economic powers
of large corporations (Galbraith, 1978).

Advantages of Large Corporations

Giant corporations have a number of legal, bureaucratic, and
ideological characteristics that contribute to their powers in soci
ety.

Corporations are enduring legal constructions recognized by the

state through chartering, allowing legal recognition of the rights of
corporations to hold property and act in the interests of the cor
porate investors without being limited by the temporal and spatial
boundaries of individual actors in the society (Clinard & Yeager,
1980.

The accumulation of value and the concentration of resources

that may occur in the structure and process of legal incorporation
are the primary bases for the economic power of large corporations.
Large corporations, by virtue of their size, have a number of bureau
cratic characteristics that may also be highlighted.
Unique to the corporate form is the separation of the ownership
of corporate resources from the management of corporate resources
(Dahl, 1973; Stone, 1975); as a result, the decision-making processes
of large corporations occur on a collective level (Davids, 1967;
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Kriesberg, 1976).

Since the position rather than the individual

is the basic unit within the corporate organization (Coleman, 1978),
the quality of outcome of corporate activity is largely independent
of the qualities of persons inhabiting particular positions (Gross,
1980).

The structure of large corporations involves a division of

labor and delegation of powers that allows specialization in the
tasks necessary for successful corporate action.

This specializa

tion, in turn, allows greater efficiency in accomplishing these tasks
(Davids, 1967).
Because of the legal and bureaucratic characteristics of large
corporations, they enjoy some advantages over the individual in the
struggle to accumulate capital and resources.

By virtue of its size,

the giant corporation is less affected by forces in its environment
(Davids, 1967).

By virtue of its control over resources, the giant

corporation can manipulate the image it presents to the general
public (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Evans & Lundman, 1980; Molotch &
Lester, 1978) and control corporate information accessible to public
view (Chatov, 1975; Mueller, 1973; Tirman, 1978).

By virtue of its

relationship to the military complex, it is privy to research and
development information generated by public agencies with public
funds (Mills, 1957).

By virtue of its transnational operations, the

giant corporation is better able to neutralize threats against its
performance, threats that include adverse tax structures, competi
tion, and uncertain markets (Baran & Sweezy, 1966; Clinard & Yeager,
1980).
The legal, bureaucratic, and ideological characteristics of
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giant corporations provide advantages for their economic function
ing.

These characteristics help to assure the social, economic, and

political powers of the giant corporations.

They may, however, be

factors in the misconduct as well as the conduct of the corporate
actor (Davids, 1967).

The problem of corporate misconduct stems

from the problem of corporate power and is shaped by the characteris
tics of the corporate actor.

The examination of corporate powers re

quires attention to the abuse of those powers for it is in this area
that the unequal power relations between corporate and individual
actors are most clearly problematic for society.

Corporate Power and Corporate Misconduct

The abuse of corporate powers occurs when corporations utilize
powers not legitimately theirs or when legitimate powers are utilized
inappropriately.

Analyses of these issues are, in a manner similar

to analyses of corporate powers, dependent upon the model of social
organization utilized in the examination.

Marcuse (1973) relates

the abuse of corporate power to market concentration and, ultimately,
to the capitalist system.
It seems it [American capitalism] cannot function,
cannot grow any more without the use of illegal,
illegitimate means, without the practice of violence
in the various branches of material and intellectual
culture (p. 502).
Marcuse exemplifies the position of those authors who challenge the
ideological legitimacy of the powers of the giant corporations.

He

does not view corporate power as having automatic access to ideolog
ical legitimacy on the basis of shared values, such as the value of
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private property, in the society.

Authors within the conflict para

digm emphasize coercion of rather than consensus concerning societal
values.

The source and content of values are subjected to analysis

within the set of assumptions underlying social organization asso
ciated with this paradigm.

The ability of the giant corporation to

influence societal values through legal, political, and social struc
tures calls into question the ideological legitimacy of all corporate
powers.

In the conflict view, then, corporate misconduct may re

flect and be reflected by the ideological illegitimacy of the power
of corporate entities.

According to Marcuse, the growth of corpora

tions into monopolistic giants means that "...today's conglomerations
and multinational corporations would, by their very structure, exer
cise conspiratorial and illegitimate power" (1973, p. 502).
Although the ideological legitimacy of corporate power is not an
issue in the functionalist paradigm, the functional and moral le
gitimacy of corporate power is in question in both the functionalist
and conflict paradigms.* The debates over the functional legitimacy
of corporate power generally focus on the economic power of corpora
tions and the mechanisms by which greater efficiency in economic
production may be reached.

Boyle (1979), for example, argues against

the economies of scale in advocating change in the American automo
bile industry while Sichel (1979) supports the current structure of
this industry and defends the level of competition that exists in
it.

Gramm (1979) challenges the appropriateness of the arguments,

pointing out that limiting the issues to those of economic power
omits the interrelationships between powers and the effect of such
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interrelationships on the locus of power among corporations rather
than individuals. Perhaps more importantly, Gramm chastises Boyle
for his acceptance of the ideological legitimacy of private market
competition without critical evaluation of the principle.
Superficial contact with the historical-institutional
setting of the problem is seen in Boyle's apparent ac
ceptance of the existing position of the industry in
the nation's economy and overall power structure. He
questions neither the industry's domination of trans
portation in the nation nor the portion of natural re
sources devoted to the manufacture and' movement of au
tomobiles (1979, p. 86).
In the conflict view, then, functional legitimacy may not be evalu
ated in isolation from the (1) historical and institutional alterna
tives to the present structure or (2) the interrelationships between
the powers that have accrued to the corporate form.

In functionalists'

view, the existing structure does not provide a basis for criticism
of the ideological legitimacy of corporate power since societal
agreement on the structure, regardless of alternatives, is assumed.
In both models of social organization corporate misconduct may be
equated with functional illegitimacy of the powers of corporate en
tities.

In the conflict view, however, the source of the illegitima

cy lies in the structure of relations of production and distribution,
while in the functionalist view the source of illegitimacy lies in
the failure to establish and meet performance criteria within the
present structure of relations.
Corporate misconduct may also be equated with moral illegiti
macy of the powers of corporate entities.

In both the functionalist

and conflict paradigms, the failure to follow legal and ethical
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standards of behavior in the pursuit of performance goals is a basis
for moral illegitimacy.

A focus of disagreement between the two

models is the extent to which the political and social powers of
large corporations have dictated the content, implementation, and
application of these standards.

The conflict model posits the ‘

greatest impact of corporate powers in these standards, a further
basis for moral illegitimacy of corporate power and for corporate
misconduct.
The abuse of corporate power by corporations may take a variety
of forms.

The social, political, and economic aspects of corporate

power may be differentially susceptible to charges of ideological,
functional or moral illegitimacy and, therefore, charges of corporate
misconduct-.

Corporate misconduct, whether it is the illegitimate

use of corporate powers or the inappropriate use of legitimate cor
porate powers, serves to highlight the problematic nature of social,
political, and economic relations between corporate and individual
actors in the society.

When corporate power supersedes other insti

tutional powers in the society, the issues of corporate responsibil
ity and the social control of corporate power must be addressed.

It

is the form, extent, and effectiveness of institutional and public
reactions to corporate power and corporate misconduct that consti
tutes the second major focus of this research.

The Social Control of Corporations

The utilization of political, economic, and social powers by
large corporations raises the issue of the legitimacy of these powers.
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The problematic nature of the ideological, functional, and moral
legitimacy of corporate powers emphasizes the necessity for their
control.

The powers of giant corporations are legitimate only if

they are subject to other institutionalized powers and mechanisms.
Unless the powers of corporations are formally recognized, mechanisms
for control are unlikely to be effective.

Discussions of the con

trol of corporate power have centered around the issues of corporate
responsibility and the efficacy of various institutionalized and
public reactions to corporate power.

Corporate Responsibility

Examination of the social control of corporations requires atten
tion to the related issue of corporate responsibility.

A view of the

corporation as a social and political entity as well as an economic
enterprise necessitates that public or social purposes be served by
the chartering of corporations (Dahl, 1973).

Implicit in the con

ception of the corporation as an acting social entity is the moral
responsibility of acting organizations (Gross, 1980).

Alternative

views of corporate responsibility are congruent with alternative
views of the legitimacy of corporate powers.
Corporate responsibility may refer to responsibilities to the
community, responsibilities to the consumer, responsibilities to em
ployees, responsibilities to the stockholders^ and responsibilities
to the society as a whole (Epstein, 1969).

The levels of responsi

bility are further clarified by a distinction between the legal,
economic, and social responsibilities of corporations.

Although
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economist Friedman (1977) limits corporate responsibility to profit
maximization to help maintain a strong economy, Davis (1977) and
Hayes (1977) view corporate responsibility within a broader frame
work of power.

Since corporations, in their views, wield social,

political, and economic powers, corporate responsibilities involve
legal, social, and economic aspects.

Corporate responsibilities,

then, while consistent with the profit maximization motive of or
ganizations in the economic sector, are not limited to economic con
siderations.

Davis proposes that the powers of corporations demand

attention to social and legal responsibilities as well as economic
responsibilities.

'

If business has the power, then a just relationship de
mands that business also bear responsibility for its
actions in these areas. Social responsibility arises
from concern about the consequences of business's acts
as they affect the interests of others. Business de
cisions do have social consequences (1977, p. 182).
The legal responsibilities of corporations are defined by state
and federal laws and regulations.

The more inclusive view of cor

porate responsibility reflected in Davis' statement requires not only
that corporations not engage in illegal behaviors but also that they
live up to their positions in major social institutions.

The defini

tion of the role of the corporation in the alleviation of social
costs directly related to the corporation's activities or in the
alleviation of social needs in general is, in part, a function of the
preferred role of the corporate actor and the legitimacy of cor
porate activities in political and social as well as economic insti
tutions.

While political and social activities that enhance the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
quality of life may be essential for the moral legitimacy of the
corporation, such activities may represent an illegitimate use of
corporate powers if the functional legitimacy of corporations re
quires that, corporate attention be focused on economic factors
(Freidman , 1971) or if the ideological legitimacy of corporations is
questionable (Marcuse, 1973).
Control mechanisms, such as regulation and disclosure, have been
suggested as the means by which to legitimate the powers of corpora
tions (McConnell, 1967; Stevenson, 1980).

Control mechanisms allow

formal recognition of the powers, and at the same time, provide
standards for behavior that potentially increase the constituency
of the corporation and the scope of benefits and beneficiaries.

The

symbolic and instrumental effects of these control mechanisms on the
legitimacy of corporate powers and their exercise are particularly
important foci in societal reactions to the use and abuse of corpo
rate power.

Mechanisms for Corporate Control

Galbraith advocates control of corporations on the basis of
their public character and the public effect of their policies and
activities.
Where the public interest — in safety of products,
effect on environment, effect of price and wage set
tlements on the economy, the equity of profits and exe
cutive compensation — is at issue, there is no natural
right to be left alone. Nor is there any natural right
to secrecy (1973, p. 7).
The mechanisms that have been utilized to protect the public interest
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from illegitimate and inappropriate use of corporate powers have
included legal remedies, competition, direct intervention into cor
porate processes, countervailing forces, democratization of corporate
processes, and administrative regulation.

Corporations and the Law

The legal environment of the corporation is of particular im
portance in its functioning.

To a large extent the law has been a

supportive force in the functioning of giant corporations.

Gross

(1980) cites the effects of the law in reducing uncertainty in the
environments of large organizations; the predictable character of
the law produces a stabilized environment.

Emphasis on the formal

rationality of the law is congruent with the separation between the
legal and business institutions, a basic premise for the legal
legitimation of corporations (Albrow, 1975).

Harris (1973) demon

strates the corporate use of legal tools to translate economic into
political power and to ensure corporate influence over political
processes.
The law as an independent mechanism for the social control of
corporations suffers from a variety of theoretical and practical
impediments.

Stone (1975) minimizes the threat of the law to cor

porate functioning, especially when its effects are .compared to
other threats in the corporation's environment.

The reasons for

this ineffectiveness, according to Stone, may be traced to the in
dividual constructs underlying the promulgation and enforcement of
laws utilized to control corporations.

The law does not respond to
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the organizational features of corporations; the legal concept of
juristic person, while allowing the legal system to react to the
corporation as an acting entity, has decreased its effectiveness.
The ambiguous nature of the substance of the law as it relates to
corporate actors and the individual bias in the legal system has
meant that corporations are less subject to legal controls than are
individuals in the society.

Stone finds this situation especially

deplorable since "...present law has to carry, vis-a-vis giant cor
porations, more of the burden of social control than the law has to
carry in dealing with ordinary human beings" (1975, p. 36).

Prag

matic impediments to the utilization of the law have been cited by a
number of authors (for example, Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Lauderdale
et al., 1979; Vaughn, 1980).

The low public visibility of corporate

abuse, the diffuse victimization of corporate abuse, the organiza
tional structure of corporations, the lack of resources to implement
legal actions against corporations, the ability of the corporation to
use legitimate and illegitimate social and political powers to pro
tect its position, and the ineffectiveness of legal sanctions against
corporations are among the most important Impediments to the practi
cal application of the law to corporate abuse.
Control of corporations through legal mechanisms has, neverthe
less, been attempted.

The legal system, unlike other mechanisms for

the social control of corporations, involves specific reactions to
misconduct as well as standards by which to encourage the moral le
gitimacy of corporate powers and corporate activities.

The legal

system is a component of the state and an instrument of public power.
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Its major concern is with the moral legitimacy of corporate powers
and abuses within that framework.

The utilization of civil and

criminal proceedings in attempts to curb the social, political,
and/or economic powers of corporations have challenged the moral
legitimacy of these powers and have raised a number of issues par
ticularly germane to corpoate misconduct.
(1)

Of concern here are

theoretical concerns in the application of legal remedies to the

illegitimate use and abuse of corporate powers, (2) the organization
al impact on legal liability, and (3) the philosophies and goals un
derlying the sanctioning of corporations and corporate executives.

Legal Remedies in the Control of Corporations. Examination of
the role of legal mechanisms is clarified by specification of op
posing models of the relationship between law and society (Michalowski,
1977).

In the functionalist paradigm, law is assumed to reflect the

will of the people; the law serves all people equally; and violators
of the law represent a unique sub-group in the society.

This model

is based on a pluralist model of society and assumes basic agreement
of what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior, agreement which is
reflected in the legal institution.

The model of law and society

found in the conflict paradigm assumes an imbalance of power in the
society and a continuous struggle to maintain or attain power.

In

this view, the law is used by people in power to maintain their
power so that the legal institution serves the interests of the
dominant groups.
The issue raised in these models of the relationships between
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law and social organization is the extent to which the legal insti
tution is or can be controlled by powerful actors in other social
institutions.

The influence of large corporations on the substantive

and procedural ramifications of laws relating to corporate opera
tions has been the subject of much discussion in the literature on
the control of corporations.
within this debate:

Carson (1974) identifies several foci

the extent to which powerful actors, like large

corporations, participate in the formulation of laws related to the
control of corporations; the extent to which laws inimical to the
interests of powerful actors in the society constitute a challenge
to their autonomy and to the conflict view of the relationship be
tween law and society; the extent to which the autonomy of powerful
actors and their influence on the law reflect cohesion among
dominant groups; the extent to which, through coercive power, the
law generates consensus in the society rather than consensus leading
to the formulation of laws; and the extent to which the perceived
stability of the social order is a function of the coercive power of
laws.

These concerns emphasize the importance of the law-creation

process and the assumptions underlying varying views of this process.
Graham (1980) and Shover (1980) have examined the law creation
process for corporate influences, discussing the ramifications of
their findings for the debate between the pluralist and radical
positions.

Both found that a major goal of corporate influence on

law is predictability in the environment of the corporation.
The history of strip mining legislation indicates that
businessmen do not object to the criminalization of
their conduct so much as they object to the inclusion
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of irrational or incalculable elements in criminalizing
legislation (Shover, 1980, p. 36).
Both authors found that corporate influence is strongest near the end
of the legislative process, but neither found unqualified support
for the radical position that posits corporate control over the le
gislative process.

Authors advocating the radical position have

cited the infrequency with which laws inimical to dominant interests
are enforced (Chambliss, 1973; McCormick, 1977), the expressive,
rather than instrumental, goals of legislative processes that con
front corporate power ( Reasons & Goff, 1980), and the conflict be
tween substantive and formal rationality in the application of legal
processes to powerful actors (Sutton & Wild, 1978) as explanations
for the ineffectiveness of the law in controlling dominant actors,
despite the presence of laws and legal mechanisms by which they
could be controlled.
Legislation against the interests of powerful actors may reflect
interelite conflicts, conflicts which may be reduced by the legisla
tion, if not the implementation, of laws (Chambliss, 1973).

Shover

(1980) found evidence of such conflicts between large and small
operations in his study of the coal industry, an industry already
characterized by concentration of production.

Reich (1973) dis

cusses the role of the law in allowing private organizations to
exercise public power and in the concentration of power and re
sources in the private sector.
While furthering the power of the Corporate State, 'the
law has also served the function of advancing private
interests. As the nation has become a legalistic socie
ty, law has increasingly become the medium in which pri
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vate maneuver for power, status, and financial gain could
take place (p. 448).
The law, then, may be used to resolve interelite conflict and as a
tool in the struggle for power between dominant groups.

While the

ability of the giant corporation to utilize the law effectively has
been established (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Green et al., 1979; Harris,
1973; Schonfield, 1965), the conditions under which this ability is
utilized against other elites have not been examined fully (Chambliss,
1973; Freitag, 1978).
The existence of and reaction to inter- and intra- group con
flict raises a final issue, the relationship between the law and
stability of the social order.

The relationship between law and so

cial stability is subject to diverse interpretations within the
functionalist and conflict paradigms.

In the functionalist position,

the law is a mechanism that is independent of political and economic
domination and is, therefore, viewed as a tool by which public in
terests, rather than corporate interests, are served.

Selznick

(1968) expresses this view in discussing the increasing importance
of social interests in the legal order.
The increasing interdependence of existence in modern
society and correlative changes in values have weak
ened the claims of private interests and stimulated
the quest for criteria of social worth (p. 57).
The importance of social concerns, according to Selznick, is growing
despite the emergence of "the large organization as the representa
tive institution of modern society" (Selznick, 1968, p. 57), reveal
ing his assumption that significant differentials do not exist among
the abilities of actors in the society to influence legal decisions.
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An alternative view is presented by Reich (1973), who views the law.
as a means by which to perpetuate a bias in favor of more powerful
elements of the society, when he says:
When law is employed to serve the Corporate State, the
people do not know what has- been done to them, for law
gets into the individual's mind and substitutes its ex
ternal standards, whatever they may be, for the indi
vidual's own standards (p. 452).
Those aspects of the law that give expression to particular values
without attention to enforcement problems or practice are especially
suited to the process delineated in Reich's statement (Reasons &
Goff, 1980).

This, however, is not necessarily a conscious process on

the part of law-makers.

Laws which effectively serve the interests

of corporate actors in the society may reflect "the mobilization of
bias" in the legal system, a system which accepts and promotes the
ideological legitimacy of the institutional powers of corporate ac
tors (Chambliss, 1974).
The civil and criminal legal remedies for illegitimate or inap
propriate use of corporate powers are restricted by the ideological
bases that underlie the corporate economic and legal systems.
The heart of a capitalist economic system is the pro
tection of private property which is, by definition, the
cornerstone upon which capitalist economies function. It
is not surprising, then, to find that the criminal law
reflects this basic concern (Chambliss, 1974, p. 25).
The ideological legitimacy of corporate powers is assured within the
legal system and the functional legitimacy of business is considered
beyond the scope of the legal system (Albrow, 1975); the application
of legal remedies are a response to questions of the moral legitimacy
of corporate powers.

The effectiveness of the law in the control of
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corporate social, economic, and political power is affected by con
cerns in the application of the law as well as those in the creation
of the law.

A basic question in the application of legal remedies

centers on the legal liability of corporations and their executives.

Organizational Versus Individual Liability. The effective use
of legal mechanisms in the control of corporations is based on the
premise that delineation of liability will enhance the responsibil
ity of corporations and their executives.

The philosophical and

practical impediments to the effective application of civil and
criminal laws decrease the likelihood of a direct link between the
application of the law and control of corporate behavior.

It must

be recognized that legal liability is a mechanism that is used in
conjunction with other responses, for example, regulation, and its
effectiveness cannot be divorced from those responses.

The organiza

tional nature of corporate violations and the complex structure of
interactions within corporations necessitates attention to the ef
fects of the legal liability of corporate actors versus the effects
of the legal liability of corporate executives on the control of cor
porations through the application of the law.

This issue arises be

cause corporate executives exercise power on behalf of the corpora
tion and for the benefit of the corporation.
The relative effectiveness of the legal liability of the corpora
tion or the executive is contingent upon a variety of factors and
processes.

Among these are the extent to which the personal ethics

of executives or the corporate ethics of the organization influence
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the use and abuse of corporate power, the extent to which the deci
sion-making processes within the corporation allow the infusion of
personal ethics and determination of the influence of particular
executives, the extent to which the corporation is responsible for
the activities of its employees, and the extent to which the cor
poration and/or the executive is able to neutralize legal threats.
Coleman (1978), Davids (1967), Elkins (1976), Fisse (1980), Haworth
(1959), and Yoder (1978) defend the principle of corporate liability,
citing the collective decision-making processes within organizations,
the ineffectiveness of procedures institutionalized within organiza
tions to deal with the abuse of corporate power, and the problems of
identifying specific individuals within the corporation responsible.
Among those advocating that individual executives be considered lia
ble for the abuse of corporate power are Clinard and Yeager (1980),
Dershowitz (1961a), Geis (1978), and Sutherland (1949).

The inef

fectiveness of sanctioning a giant corporation, the fall-out effects
on other societal actors not responsible for the abuse of corporate
power, and the greater deterrence value of prosecutions of indi
viduals support their positions.
The influence of personal and/or corporate ethics on the activi
ties of corporations is an area of concern related to the legal
liability of corporations and/or corporate executives.

Some authors,

among them Conklin (1977), Epstein (1969), Garrett (1968), and
Stone (1975), view the corporation as capable of achieving morality
in its behaviors and practices.

In Stone's formulation, it is not

mere conformity to external rules that constitutes social responsi
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bility, but a cognitive process that allows autonomy and creativity.
Stone does not view corporate responsibility as essentially dif
ferent from individual responsibility; corporate ethics may, there
fore, be determined by the personal ethics of individual actors
within the corporation.

Ladd (1970) argues against this position.

In his view, membership in formal organizations depersonalizes the
individual to the extent that individuals within organizations, and
their personal ethics, are interchangeable and expendable.
A distinctive mark of such organizations is that they
make a clear-cut distinction between the acts and re
lationships of individuals in their official capacity
with the organization and their private capacity.
Decisions of individual decision-makers in an ‘organiza
tion are attributed to the organization and not to the
individual. In that sense they are impersonal. In
dividual office-holders are in principle replaceable
by other individuals without affecting the continuity
or identity of the organization (p. ‘488).
The formal rationality of corporations in their attempts to reach or
ganizational goals, according to Ladd, mitigates against the develop
ment of corporate ethics and the infusion of personal ethics into
corporate processes.

Kriesberg (1976) has delineated three models of

organizational decision-making:

the corporation as a rational actor

with unified decision-making processes, the corporation as a con
glomeration of sub-units that make decisions within a framework of
standardized procedures, and the corporation as a bureaucratic struc
ture in which a system of individuals contribute to, but do not con
trol, the decision-making processes.

The decision-making processes

of corporations, to a large extent, determine the organizational re
ceptivity to personal ethics of the executives.

Kriesberg's models
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accentuate the conclusion by other authors, for example, Gross
(1978), Jackall (1980), and Needleman and Needleman (1979), that
the procedures for decision-making in large organizations supersede
the ethics of individuals, providing a context conducive to varying
degrees to the moral illegitimacy of corporate powers.

Gross con

tends that organizations are inherently criminogenic, that the or
ganizational structure precludes the moral legitimacy of the cor
poration.

Needleman and Needleman posit variation between crime

coercive and crime facilitative models of criminogenic organizations.
Jackall, congruent with Ladd's position, concludes that the deper
sonalization of decision-making separates the individuals from the
consequences of their decision, thus encouraging the abuse of cor
porate powers.

Reiss (1978), Schrager and Short (1978), and Shover

(1978) take a more moderate position and view the organizational con
text as a potential impetus for the violation of legal standards but
do not eliminate the effects of personal characteristics and values.
Steiner (1977) remains optimistic about institutionalizing procedures
within the organizational process that would support the moral le
gitimacy of the corporation.
An alternative consideration in the effectiveness of the applica
tion of legal mechanisms is the scope of corporate responsibility
for the activities of corporate employees.

The Harvard Law Review

(1979) provides some analysis of the relationship between the cor
poration and its individuals.

The three models that emerge, that

the corporation is responsible for:

(l) its agents and actors,

(2) its policy-makers, or (3) reasonable procedures to ensure the
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moral legitimacy of the corporation, provide a basis for the dispute
between Elkins (1976) and McVisk (1978) over the imputation of be
haviors and intent from the inner circle of corporate management and
subordinates to the corporate actor.

Elkins supports a broad ap

plication of this process of imputation since employees at all
levels may act illegally for the benefit of the corporation and/or
with the knowledge of the corporation.

Clinard and Yeager (1980)

found evidence that the nature of the legal offense is likely to be
an important factor in the level of employee involved.
The ability of the corporation and corporate executives to neu
tralize legal threats against their functioning may reduce the effec
tiveness of legal liability, independent of the issues already con
sidered here.

The leniency with which executives are treated,

indemnification procedures, corporate support for individual execu
tives, and the complexity of illegal behaviors are likely to inhibit
the control of corporate executives (Clinard & Yeager, 1980).

The

utilization of the nolo contendere plea (Davids, 1967; Dershowitz,
1961a), the insignificance of maximum penalties (Davids, 1967;
Lauderdale et al., 1979), the ability of giant corporations to resist
criminal definitions (Lauderdale et al., 1979), and the ineffective
ness of stigmatization processes (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Davids,
1967) are additional impediments to successful control of the corpo
ration's internal structure through the application of legal liabil
ity.

The sanctioning of the corporate actor raises questions con

cerning the underlying philosophies of criminal sanctions, the third
major focus of this discussion of the relationship between law and
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corporations.

Philosophies of Criminal Sanctioning of Corporate Actors. The
use of criminal sanctions have been of particular concern to a varie
ty of authors in their attention to the relationship between the law
and corporations.

Proposed sanctions for the control of the corpo

rate actor include fines, formal publicity of criminal practices,
corporate quarantine, and forced dissolution.

Yoder (1978) examines

the purposes of punishment delineated by traditional theories of
crime control and the applicability of these to the control of cor
porate crime.
Yoder takes the position that because the corporation is threat
sensitive, in that corporate decision-making structures allow time
to consider the consequences of corporate actions, knowledge of the
sanctions is likely to be available to the corporate actor, and the
economic base of corporate functioning allows the punishment to fit
the crime, general deterrence may be the purpose most congruent with
the utilization of criminal law against corporations.

Specific de

terrence requires more severe punishments than corporations usually
receive.

Retribution is criticized by Yoder as having an emotional

rather than a rational basis and is, therefore, not suitable for ap
plication to corporate activities.

Fisse defends the retributive

philosophy of punishment as a mechanism for limiting the autonomy of
the corporate actor (1980a) and proposes the imposition of community
service as a means by which to sanction the corporation (1980b).
Fisse's proposals, however, are exceptions to the general trends in
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the literature.
The evaluation of the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions
against corporations highlights the considerations of the certainty
and severity of reaction (Ermann & Lundman, 1978a; Lauderdale et al.,
1979) >. the ambiguity of the relationship between the use of criminal
sanctions and public perceptions of the behavior (Ball & Friedman,
1978), the judicial discretion involved in the levying of sanctions
(Elkins, 1976; Lauderdale et al., 1979), and the administrative dis
cretion involved in levying of sanctions (Clinard & Yeager, 1980).
Yoder emphasizes the importance of the clear definition of the goals
of sanctioning and the examination of alternatives for.their con
gruence with those goals.

The use of criminal sanctions has been

•avoided whenever possible in the response to the illegitimate cor
porate use of power, in part because of the complex considerations
in levying sanctions and the difficulty of determining their effec
tiveness.

The effectiveness of the legal liability of corporations

as a social control mechanism is inhibited by the controversies sur
rounding the influence of corporate actors on the substantive and
procedural considerations in the law, the organizational context of
the behaviors, and the appropriate justifications for sanctioning
corporations.

Legal liability is, however, just one of the remedies

proposed for excessive or illegitimate corporate power.

A second

remedy, competition, is an important consideration in the functional
and moral legitimacy of corporations-.
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Competition and Corporations

Green et al. (1979) deplore the collusion that exists in nearly
every major industry, a situation they link to the profitability of
practices restraining trade.

Reasons and Goff (1980) reveal that,

in Canada, monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures are in
creasingly being viewed as legitimate within the business community.
Clinard and Yeager (1980) exemplify non-competitive practices in the
automobile, oil, and pharmaceutical industries.

Competition as a Controlling Factor. Competition as a control
ling factor

the environment of large corporations directly ad

dresses the moral and functional legitimacy of their market and
economic powers.

Competition, whether it results from "unfettered

individualism" or government policies is advocated by many as a na
tural regulator of business power (Dudden, 1957).

In the model of

unfettered individualism and competition, government programs and
government assistance are viewed as an important source of monopoly
and oligopoly (Adams, 1973; Gruchy, 1979).

The workable competition

model, on the other hand, does not eliminate governmental influence
but calls for government policies that would support and encourage
competitive practices.
According to this approach the social control of busi
ness is largely a matter of securing greater effi
ciency in the allocation of resources (Gruchy, 1979,
p. 120).
Advocates of the workable competition model argue that competition,
properly maintained, would reduce the level of market power and would
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re-distribute this power from corporate actors to consumers.
The influence of competition on the moral and functional le
gitimacy of corporations has been questioned by Vaughn (1980) and
Lauderdale et al. (1979).

Competition may, according to these au

thors lead to less responsible behavior by business.
(1979)

Green et al.

report the widespread belief by business that competition

leads to greater collusion, rather than less, because competition
adds to the threats to corporate performance and, therefore, to the
defensive stance of corporations against these threats.

The support

for competition as a controlling factor, nevertheless, has been en
during and enthusiastic, perhaps because it is the least threatening,
of the remedies proposed for excessive and abusive use of corporate
power.

The Law and Competition. The economic regulations that have
been instituted to ensure the maintenance of competition were osten
sibly designed to protect the economy from the powers of large cor
porations (Green et al., 1979).

The development of administrative

bodies in the late 19th century, in response to the individualists
and trust-busters who feared the growing concentration of economic
power, was necessitated by legislation designed to curtail restric
tive business practices.

A second wave of economic regulation oc

curred in the 1930s, consistent with the programs of the New Deal and
its philosophy of increased intervention of government into American
life (Geis & Meier, 1977).
Legislation to increase competition in American industry, par-
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ticularly anti-trust legislation, has been of interest in the debate
between theorists with pluralist and radical interpretations of law
and society.

Economic legislation that provides for government in

tervention into the business sphere has been cited as evidence sup
porting the appropriateness of the pluralist model of society and of
the relationship between law and social organization.

In this view,

the emergence of laws controlling the interests of business accen
tuates the responsiveness of the legal and economic systems to the
public interest.
A number of related factors must be considered, however, in the
relationship between anti-trust legislation and competition:
(1)

Economic legislation specifically recognizes the ideologi

cal legitimacy of private business by seeking to levy controls ex
ternal to the private sector.

Economic legislation, rather than being

a threat to economic actors, may serve to entrench their positions
(McConnell, 1967; Young, 1974).
(2) Economic legislation expresses some values over others.

As

it espouses the value of private property rights, it also espouses
the value of competition.

The extent to which legislation is in

tended to reify particular values in order to perpetuate a particular
view of the social order must be recognized (Chambliss, 1974; Reasons
& Goff, 1980).

Enforcement practices and impacts reveal the extent

to which the law has pragmatic, instrumental results; examination of
these results within the conflict, as well as the functionalist model
of society is necessary (McCormick, 1977; Reasons & Goff, 1980).
There is wide-spread agreement that enforcement of anti-trust
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laws in the U.S. has not been vigorous (Green et al., 1979; McCormick,
1977; Reasons & Goff, 1980).

Snider came to similar conclusions

about the Canadian system, both in terms of enactment and enforcement
of economic legislation.

The reasons, it is argued, stem from

...their [large corporations] direct and indirect con
trol over the life chances of most Canadians through
their near-monopolization of employment opportunities,
and their dominance over the health of the economic
system. Their indirect power is ideological. The
views and interests of the corporate elite are pre
dominant forces which shape, to varying degrees, the
world view of everyone in the society...This does
not mean that reforms are never instituted...However,
such reforms wiil be resisted as long as possible by
the corporate elite, and instituted only when they
are necessary to' stave off greater threats to the
status-quo, of which they are the main beneficiaries
(Snider, 1979, p. 118).
Reasons and Goff concur in their conclusions on anti-trust legislation.
Competition legislation largely reflects the general
interests of capitalism rather than necessarily the
specific interests of particular capitalists. It
provides the appearance of widespread control while its
substance does not greatly inhibit increasing concen
tration and monopolization (1980, p. 137).

Public Opinion and Corporations

Examination of the effects of public opinion on the activities
of corporations directs attention to the interrelationships between
the influence of public opinion, the effects of the mass media, the
seriousness of the corporate abuse to be controlled, and the official
responses to corporate abuses.

A consideration inherent in this is

sue is the ability of corporate actors to influence public opinion
and the mass media.
The relationship between public perceptions of corporate abuses
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of power and mass media response to these abuses is subject to con
flicting interpretations.

The degree to which the mass media re

flect public opinion regarding abuse of corporate powers versus the
degree to which the mass media shape public opinion on this matter
is the central issue in the debate.

This debate is most clearly

delineated in Evans and Lundman's (1980) replication of an earlier
study of newspaper coverage and the electrical conspiracy case
(Dershowitz, 1961b).

Evans and Lundman examined the prominence of

articles in the print media on collusion within the folding carton
industry, finding, as did Dershowitz, that individual corporate exe
cutives involved in anti-trust activities were likely to be discussed
in the print media more prominently and more negatively than the
corporate actors involved.

Furthermore, Evans and Lundman found that

media attention to these illegal activities of corporations actually
decreased between 1961 and 1976.
In general the newspapes surveyed failed to provide fre
quent, prominent, or criminally oriented coverage of
this criminal conspiracy to fix and raise prices of
folding cartons. Taking the 1961 data and the replica
tive data together, it would appear that newspapers
function to protect corporate reputations, principally
by their failure to frequently, prominently, and con
clusively link corporations with crime (Evans & Lundman,
1980, p. 10).
Coleman (1974) argues that the policies of newspapers on coverage
of abuses of corporate powers, in the form of corporate crime, re
flects the interests and desires of the reading public.

The protec

tion of corporate reputations by the print media may, however, re
flect the power of corporations to control the news about them.
Molotch and Lester (1978) compared the local and national news
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coverage of unfavorable corporate activities, concluding that the
role of powerful actors in the production of the news results in
the expression of their interests to the partial or complete exclusion
of others.

Flynn (1973) and Yoder (1978), in order to rectify what

they view as a distortion in news coverage, advocate a legal require
ment that corporations advertise their involvement in activities that
are legally sanctioned.

The views of the functionalist and conflict

models of society are evident in the alternate views presented by
these authors.

The major point of disagreement, of course, is the

representation of popular versus elite interests in the mass media.
The relationship between the seriousness of the corporate abuse
and public reactions, including official reactions, is clouded by a
number of factors.

Schrager and Short (1980) found that public

reactions are likely to be harsh when the negative impacts of the
corporate activities may result in physical harm rather than economic
consequences.

Cullen et al. (1980) and Rossi et al. (1974) arrived

at similar conclusions, raising doubts about the emphasis tra
ditionally placed on the distinction between upper class and lower
class crimes as a determining factor in public reactions to various
types of crimes (Geis, 1978).

The assessment of the seriousness of

particular activities is seldom the result of a purely analytical
process (Lindblom, 1980), allowing the input of a variety of polit
ical influences on the determination of the criteria.

Schiller (1976)

discusses the impact of political influences on the production of
scientific information and Swartz (1978) applies this point of view
to the generation of information important to corporate actors,
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stressing the control of corporations over information processes
related to the abuses of corporate power.
The impact of seriousness, media treatment, and public percep
tions on the official responses to abuses of corporate power also
merits attention.

The controversy here surrounds the leniency of

official sanctions against corporations that abuse their powers in a
manner that violates legal regulations of their behaviors.

Sutherland

(1977) very early in his research cited the unorganized attitudes of
the public in the leniency of official reactions to corporate of
fenses.

Kadish (1977) arrives at the same conclusion but, unlike

Sutherland, attributes the lack of public antipathy in this area to
the moral neutrality of the activities of corporations.

Ball and

Friedman (1978), Geis (1978), Geis and Meier (1977), and Johnson
(1968)

argue against the Kadish premise that public attitudes pre

cede and determine official response and that the benign character of
corporate actions explains the leniency of reactions to corporate
crime.

Ball and Friedman (1978) attribute the public apathy to the

recency of laws forbidding the corporate actions at issue.

Geis

(1978) calls for more negative official reactions to elicit more
negative public reactions.

The more recent findings by Schrager and

Short (1980) that link public responses to seriousness and the ear
lier research by Newman (1953) that supports the proposition that
the public favors stricter penalties for corporate abuses than are
generally levied bring into question not only the direction but also
the validity of the relationship between public opinions of and of
ficial reactions to corporate activities.
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The controlling influence of public opinion on the activities ■
of corporations is mitigated by corporate control over the informa
tion available to the public and the corporate manipulation of the
public image of business and corporations.

Clinard and Yeager (1978),

however, cite a number of factors that contribute to an increased
concern in the population with the powers of corporations, factors
that include the consumer movements, prosecution of corporate viola
tions, increased public concern with environmental issues, increased
concern with human rights and crimes in the political arena, and in
creased concern with the power and influence of all large organiza
tions in the society.

The ambiguity of the findings presented here

indicate that public opinion is unlikely to be an effective control
over corporate organizations.

Proposals for control that serve to

buttress the implications of the law, competition, and public opinion
by providing an organizational focus for their effects must also be
considered.

Organized Challenges to Corporations

The control of corporations through direct intervention into
corporate decision-making, through the formation and maintenance of
countervailing groups in the society, and through democratization of
the corporation are examples of organized mechanisms for the con
trol of corporate actors.

Implicit in such mechanisms is the recog

nition that the entity to be controlled has organizational features
and that the control processes must occur within an organizational
context.

The concentration of power in the corporate sector, more-
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over, forces the utilization of power in any mechanism that effec
tively challenges the power of corporations.
Advocates of intervention into corporate decision-making pro
cesses propose various means for increasing the responsibility of cor
porate actors.

The means proposed include public directorships

(Stone, 1975, 1978), nationalization (Hacker, 1973; Shepherd, 1973),
federal incorporation (Nader, 1973), and the social audit (Corson &
Steiner, 1977), all of which vary in terms of the structural changes
proposed for corporate actors.

Intervention into corporate func

tioning , by whatever mechanism, is based on a view of social control
as pre-emptive as well as reactive responses and seeks to represent
the public interest in the decision-making processes.

Stone's pro

posals are particularly emphatic about the need for the social control
apparatus to respond to the organizational features of the- corpora
tions in order that public concerns be addressed.

Corson and

Steiner’s proposed audit forces recognition of, if not reaction to,
public concern but relies on the basic morality of business enter
prises.

Both public directorships and social audits leave the

present corporate form intact while "influencing institutional direc
tion by laying down mandatory procedural and structural requirement"
(Stone, 1978, p. 332).

Nationalization and, to a lesser degree

federal incorporation, involve more extensive alteration of the
corporate structure.

Of major importance in both nationalization

and federal incorporation is explicit recognition of existing power
differentials in the present representation of business and powerful
interests.

Nationalization and federal incorporation is meant to
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bring about a shift in power relations.

A concern in eaeh of these

proposals is the extent to which the public interest would be
served if the proposals were implemented; none of the proposals
necessarily assume, however, that populist politics automatically
involve greater concern with public welfare.

Hacker (1973), for

example, questions the extent to which populist politics may be
feasible or effective; he instead favors the development of competing
power centers that would alleviate the dependence on corporate
powers in U.S. society and that would be more responsive to popular,
rather than elite, interests.
Proposals that support the maintenance of countervailing groups
and democratization seek to operationalize populist politics and
public concerns within the issue of corporate control.

Within

limited constituencies, authors of these proposals advocate populist
politics' and hope for a return of pluralism in social organization.
Dahl (1973) and Flynn (1973) are leading advocates of democratiza
tion in the operations of corporations.

The thrust of democratiza

tion is to increase internal controls on corporate functioning and
thereby eliminate, or at least decrease, the need for external con
trols.

The development and maintenance of countervailing groups

underlie the proposals by Marcus (1977) for consumer pressure,
Dershowitz (1961a) and Elkins (1976) for civil actions against cor
porations, and, to some extent, the social controls of competition
and regulation.

An assumption of both democratization and counter

vailing groups is the inherent advantage of diverse and numerous in
puts into the operation of large corporations.
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These proposals for organizational challenges to business have
been criticized on a number of dimensions.

Resistance centers on

practical and philosophical obstacles to their implementation and
is fueled by vastly different perceptions of social organization,
the role of business in society, and the relationship between corpo
rate ownership in the private sector and corporate responsiveness in
the public sector.

While Lamb et al. (1980), for example, call for

greater cooperation between the business sector and the mass media
in an effort to campaign for public acceptance of the business point
of view, Henning summarizes the opposing point of view.
The fundamental issue is power...The management myth
is that corporations are bound by the same moral
constraints and social obligations as people...Today
the myth flourishes in the care of business leaders who
use it to legitimate their autonomy...The principle
beneficiary of the current flood of corporate social
concern has been the media (1973, pp. 152-154).
With the exception of nationalization, the organizational proposals
presented here leave the myth of corporate responsibility essen
tially intact.

A major argument against nationalization, however,

is the dissatisfaction with big government akin to the dissatisfac
tion with big business.

An alternative to nationalization, federal

regulation, constitutes a final mechanism for control of large cor
porations .

Regulation and Corporations

Federal regulation, as a mechanism for social control of corpo
rations, is consistent with the liberal response to corporations.

The

liberal response, in which the ownership of property remains in pri
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vate hands while the use of the property is regulated and controlled
externally, may be contrasted with the socialist form, in which
ownership of property is removed from private hands and brought under
the domain of the state (Best & Connolly, 1976).

In the socialist

form, the state is responsible for conducting the business of the
organizations it nationalizes, while in the liberal form, the owner(s)
of the property conduct business within the limits and guidelines
established by the state.
Yankelovich (1977) reports strong public support for the liberal
response to corporate power.

Ideally, in the liberal form less

animosity is aroused in the business community because ownership re
mains in the private sector.

Furthermore, the size of the bureau

cracy needed to regulate organizations in the private sector is less
than that necessary to nationalize those organizations.

In addition,

the power of the state is not enhanced in the liberal form since
ownership remains in the private sector.

Enthusiasm for the liberal

form, however, must be tempered by the examination of issues per
tinent to the functioning of regulation.

The history and the goals

of regulation, the role of the state in the implementation and ad
ministration of regulatory proceedings, and the effectiveness of
regulation in controlling the powers of corporations are important
considerations raised in the literature on regulation.

A Brief Introduction to Regulation. The beginnings of public
administration date back to 1789 when the First Congress of the United
States authorized administrative officers for specific duties (Freed-
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man, 1978).

This was followed by the establishment of several ad

ministrative agencies, including the first regulatory commission,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887 until by 1900 one-third
of the present administrative agencies had been created (Freedman,
1978).

That these administrative agencies included regulatory func

tions is supported by Krislov and Musolf.

"... from the beginning,

overlap between ordinary executive functions and regulatory aspects
has been evident" (1964, p. 1).

Freedman (1978) cites another

period of rapid administrative growth between 1900 and 1930 and the
reinforcement of the administrative process in President Roosevelt’s
.administration and the New Deal.
Krislov and Musolf discuss a number of factors that account for
the rise of administrative agencies:

(1) the desire to protect ci

tizens through administrative as well as executive personnel,
(2)

the need for flexibility, (3) the limitations on the courts and

congress, including constitutional considerations, time limitations,
and the need for specialized information in dealing with complex prob
lems, (4) the consistency and continuity of attention and activity
in an administrative setting where responsibility is clearly allocated,
and (5) the ability of administrative agencies to deal with the ex
tremely heavy demands placed on government (1964, pp. 2-3).

Regula

tion is not the domain solely of independent regulatory agencies or
commissions.

Sellers (1964) asserts that the President, heads of

executive departments, divisions within government departments, in
dependent regulatory commissions, independent regulatory agencies, and
Federal legislative courts, for example, U.S. Customs Court, may all
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regulate private interests.

The specific processes of regulation

have waxed and waned in American history (Freedman, 1978; Noll, 1971).
The development of government bodies, in response to the trustbusters of the late 19th century, constituted the first wave of regu
lation.

The formation of monopolistic organizations in this period

is one of the factors cited by Reasons and Goff for increased inter
vention by the state into the economy.

Concomitant factors included

the transformation of the previously agriculturally based economy to
one based on commercial and industrial interests, increasing inequal
ity in the distribution of property, the increasing problems in the
transfer of property, and the transformation of property from tan
gible to intangible forms (1980, p. 128).

The muck-rakers active in

the 1920s and the weakened economy of the late twenties and early
thirties brought on the legislation of new economic regulations and
the construction of regulatory bodies to administer them.

World War

II and the Cold War years following it may be characterized by the
close relationships existing between the federal government and
economic organizations (McConnell, 1967).

In the 1960s, however, with

the prosecution of several large corporations for law violation, the
civil rights and prison reform movements which emphasized the ex
ploitation within the economic system of the rights of individuals,
and increasing criticism of the military-industrial complex, regula
tion again became an issue.

This period of regulation, however, dif

fered from those of the turn of the century and the 1930s.

While

previous regulation was designed to protect the economy, ensuring the
perpetuation of the values and ideologies necessary for the continu
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ance of private control of productive processes (Kolko, 1965), and/or
individual actors within the system from more powerful organizational
ones (Ermann & Lundman, 1978a), regulation in the 1960s and early
1970s focused on the protection of the health and safety of consumers,
workers, and the general public.

The State and Regulation. The neutrality of the state is a ma
jor issue in regulation of the business sector.

The relationship

of the state to corporations, when viewed through the assumptions of
the functionalist model of society and through the conflict model of
society takes on different connotations.

A basic issue in the debate

between the alternative views of society is the extent to which regu
lation serves elite interests or public interests (Carson, 1974;
Geis & Meier, 1977; Schrager & Short, 1980; Shover, 1980).

The

pluralists view regulation as an indication that government is a pro
duct of competing interest groups who all affect the enactment and
enforcement of public policy regarding control of corporate powers
(Aubert, 1952; Carson, 1980; Dunlop, 1977; Leavitt et al., 1978;
Lindblom, 1980).

The elitists examine the structure of influences on

regulation to establish that regulation actually serves the dominant
elite (Domhoff, 1967; Useem, 1979).

Freitag (1978) chastises the

elitists for focusing the debate on the structure of influences
rather than on the processes of conflict between the capitalist and
working classes that results in regulation that is less than respon
sive to public needs and goals.

According to Freitag, since neither

the working class nor the capitalist class is monolithic, the con
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flict results in regulations that reflect to some degree the interests
of both sides of the conflict.

Miliband (1969), while not denying

the intra-class conflicts posited by Freitag (1978) and Chambliss
(1974), stresses an historical, comparative view of policy formation
and the superior effects of the dominant interests on this process.
Regulation may serve to legitimate the powers of corporations ideo
logically, functionally or morally; regulation that appears to be
inimical to the dominant interests may in fact be serving these pur
poses.

Best and Connolly (1976) call for the introduction of "public

control and accountability into production relations themselves" (p.
180).

Such a response by the regulatory machinery, however, is un

likely for it involves the socialist alternative.

Regulation is the

liberal response of the state to the working classes in the conflict
between the working and capitalist classes.

Best and Connolly (1976)

point out that, although the state is an actor separate from the cor
porate interests in the society, its options are continually reduced
as the corporate system advances and are dependent to a large extent
on the ups and downs of the business cycle.

The Effectiveness of the Liberal Response. The effectiveness
of regulation in the control of corporations is determined by a
variety of factors.

Among these are the political nature and con

text of regulatory decision-making, the clarity of policy formation
and goal specification in regulatory reactions to the corporate
sector, the degree of coordination between regulatory bodies, and the
adequacy of the information and resources available to regulatory
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organizations.
The political nature of the regulatory process is seen most
clearly in the rule-making powers of regulatory bodies.

While

theories of administration generally deal with the implementation of
laws created by legislation, regulatory bodies have been delegated
rule-making powers by the Congress.

Shover (1980) reports that the

legislature leaves some of its most complex problems of law-creation
to the administrators.

This problem takes on added significance

when the susceptibility of regulatory bodies to special interests is
considered.

Burnham (1976), Freitag (1975), and Leavitt et al. (1978)

view regulatory bodies as more susceptible to business influences
than Congress.

The inputs into policy at the administrative level

are not officially recognized and not subject to review.

The regula

tory bodies, although they are not subject to the mechanisms devised
to enhance public participation and limit elite influence in govern
mental policy, such as election procedures and lobbying controls, do
generate public policy.
Since the regulatory bodies are involved in policy-making as
well as administration of legislative programs, the regulatory bodies
may depend to a large extent on technical evaluation and emphasize
the technical aspects of their personnel.

Without a framework for

t-h-fs expertise, however, the process may or may not be beneficial
for society.
In the development of policy, the expert is needed to
suggest alternatives, to analyze them, and to predict
their consequences. However, the policy-maker must
take account of the practicability and acceptability
of the alternatives (Massel, 1961, pp. 196-197).
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Such alternatives, analyses, and prediction may be provided by pres
sure groups which surround the organizations.

Since pressure groups

are generally special interest groups, they are unlikely to reflect
the integrative positions necessary for beneficial public policy
making.

Although these same problems exist in the legislative branch,

the more narrow scope of activity in the regulatory bodies makes them
especially amenable to pressure group tactics.
Much pressure and influence is likely to come from the industries
the regulatory bodies are attempting to regulate.

Freitag (1975) and

Jensen (1972) have supported empirically the interlocks between go
vernment and business.

Massel (1961) supports the thesis that these

interlocks are also present on the lower levels of administration.
While some would argue for greater accomodation between regulators
and regulated industries (Dunlop (1977), for example), there is
agreement in the literature that interlocks between governmentalbodies and the business sector increase the politicization of re
gulatory bodies and exacerbate the problems of controlling large
economic organizations through regulation.

Schwartz emphasizes the

advantages of the regulatory processes for the regulated when he
says, "In the field of rail and motor transportation, the Interstate
Commerce Commission was intended to hold the competitive balance be
tween the railroads and the truckers.

Instead the I.C.C. has been

well-termed the best friends the railroads have ever had" (1964, p.
22).

Kolko (1965) supports this position and highlights the close

ties between the political and economic spheres in his examination
of railroad regulation.
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The lack of clear objectives for regulation also present a prob
lem for its effectiveness.
Regulatory agencies have developed primarily as a
series of ad hoc responses to specific public policy
problems. They are not the result of a clearly de
lineated theory of the role of government in business
decision, nor of a coherent plan for extending govern
ment influence into private economic decisions (Noll,
1971, p. 8).
Henning (1973) is especially adamant about the need for national plan
ning in the regulatory system.

Without a clear policy of interven

tion, the power of corporations to influence their regulation in
creases .
The lack of coordination between government agencies is charac
terized by a lack of communication (Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Conklin,
1977), corruption in bureaucratic structures (Burnham, 1976), and
competition for scarce resources (Freedman, 1978).

Regulatory or

ganizations specialize in particular tasks (Krislov & Musolf, 1964).
In so doing, they may not keep open channels of communication with
agencies performing different but related tasks.

The complex nature

of the duties of regulatory bodies also affects the relationship be
tween these organizations and inhibits communication.

Rulings within

and between agencies may be contradictory as a result of the problems
of coordination (Weidenbaum, 1977).
Problems of information are also characteristic of ‘
the relation
ship between government and industry (Clinard & Yeager, 1980;
Leavitt et al., 1978).

Lack of information on corporate activities

stems from the inability to open corporate decision-making processes
to public view, despite the public nature of the consequences of
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private corporate decisions (Galbraith, 1973).

This leaves the

regulatory bodies dependent on the regulatees for data (Mueller, 1973;
Stone, 1975).

The inadequacy of the resources available for regula

tion exacerbate the problems of data availability and agency coordina
tion, especially given the magnitude of the responsibilities of
regulatory bodies (Clinard & Yeager, 1980).
The study of corporate power and its control by the mechanisms
examined here requires attention to the theoretical issues in the con
trol of corporations.

In Chapter II, the organizational context of

control processes, the political/economic context of decision-making
by controllers, and the reciprocity between control and power are
considered.

In each of these areas, questions which isolate the major

foci for research are presented.
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CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The power of corporations to affect the economy, other societal
institutions, and the quality of life necessitates attention to the
control of corporate actors.

A major focus of attention in the

literature has been the moral legitimacy of corporations and the is
sues surrounding the crimes and deviance of corporations.

Ideo

logical, moral and functional legitimacy are important to control
ling powers as well as to corporate powers.

Attention, however, is

focused on the effective functioning of the controlling powers.
Traditional theories of control, whether congruent with the
functionalist or conflict model of the relationship between law and
society, focus on the control of traditional, individual forms of
crime and deviance.

The underlying distinction between these com

peting models of society on the issue of control is the degree of
emphasis placed on the systems of control that have emerged.

The

control of corporate powers can best be analyzed within a framework
that allows explicit attention to the systems and mechanisms de
signed to curtail or legitimize those powers.

Spitzer (1980) ad

vocates examination of the control systems in the theoretical
constructions of individual deviance.

"The theory must explain why

a system of control emerges under specific conditions and account
for its size, focus, and working assumptions" (p. 178).

The need

for similar objectives in the study of the control of corporate
61
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powers is evidenced by the (1) relative ineffectiveness of control
mechanisms in the arena of corporate powers, (2) the ambiguous re
lationship between the state and corporations, and (3) the unexplained
relations among structures for the control of corporations and the
capitalist economic system that fostered their growth.
The problems of corporate power and its control involve explicit
attention to the functioning of controllers.

Theorists of the con

trol of corporations must be cognizant of the organizational context
of control, the political/economic context of decision-making by con
trollers, and the reciprocal relations between corporate power and
control.

The social, political, and economic powers of corporations

to influence the processes of control must be recognized throughout.

The Organizational Context of Control

Corporations, as complex organizations, present specific and
unique problems for the systems of control that have emerged; these
problems, having their roots in the organizational characteristics of
the social actors to be controlled, have helped to shape the emerging
control system in two ways:

(1) the agents of social control must

also be organizations and (2) a necessary source of power for agents
of social control is the state.

Stone (1975) calls for attempts to

control corporations which are directed to the organizational entity
above and beyond the constituent human beings of the organization.
Ermann and Lundman (1978a, 1978b) urge the examination of controlling
organizations in the process of control.

The organizational nature

of both corporations and controllers and the attending distributions
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of power present a series of impediments to the control of corpora
tions .
These impediments may be structural, that is based in the struc
ture of economic and political arrangements of the society (Best &
Connolly, 1976) or bureaucratic and, therefore, characteristic of the
controlling organizations (Ermann & Lundman, 1978b).

If the impedi

ments are structural, the ideological legitimacy of the power of
controlling organizations is threatened.

If the impediments are bu

reaucratic, the moral and functional legitimacy of controlling
powers may be questioned.

Structural impediments involve those

characteristics of the political/economic relations that mitigate
against effective control of corporate powers by controlling organiza
tions.

Best and Connolly (1976) cite the increasing inability of the

capitalist system to meet the needs of the less powerful individual
and organizational actors in the society because of the commitment of
state intervention into the economy to the process of capital ac
cumulation in the private sector.

This situation may serve as a

structural impediment to effective control of corporations, since
corporations are the major beneficiaries of the state’s commitment.
Bureaucratic impediments, discussed in Chapter I, are most clearly
associated with regulation by administrative bodies.

They are, how-

.

ever, also evident in the judicial responses to corporate power.
The politicization of control processes, the ambiguity of policy
formation, and the lack of coordination in policy implementation
are characteristic of the relationships between administrative and
corporate bodies that undermine the effectiveness of administrative
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controlling organizations.

The individual focus of legal mechanisms

and practical implications of the application of the law to corpo
rate actors decreases the efficiency of the powers of judicial
controlling organizations.
Ermann and Lundman (1978b) isolate a variety of dimensions by
which to examine the relationships between controller organizations
and corporations and which further support the organizational con
text of their interactions.

According to Ermann and Lundman's (1978)

typology, organizations have primary and secondary beneficiaries.
The primary beneficiaries of corporations are the owners of the cor
poration.

Corporations, as economic organizations, may be contrasted

with mutual benefit organizations, the primary beneficiaries of which
are the members, service organizations, the primary beneficiaries of
which are the clients, and commonwealth organizations, the primary
beneficiaries of which are the public.

In addition, each of these

organizations has secondary beneficiaries.

Controlling organizations

exist to oversee the flow of benefits from organizations to their
primary and secondary beneficiaries.

While some controlling organiza

tions for business corporations may ensure that profit-making con
tinues for primary beneficiaries, other controlling organizations
ensure that secondary beneficiaries, for example, the public-atlarge, are not harmed in the process.

The goals of the controlling

organizations for the primary beneficiaries are sometimes in conflict
with the goals of the controlling organizations for secondary bene
ficiaries.

Ermann and Lundman (1978) hypothesize that when such a

situation exists, the controlling organizations that protect the
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flow of benefits to secondary beneficiaries are limited so as not to
interfere with the interests of primary beneficiaries.

Controlling

organizations are mandated to protect the flow of benefits; the ef
fectiveness of controlling organizations is enhanced by aggressive
ness on the part of controlling organizations, delegation of power
in accomodative relationships, the celerity, certainty, and severity
of sanctions, the clarity of responsibilities, and the resources of
the controlling organizations.
The dimensions defined by Ermann and Lundman are important in
the effective functioning of controlling organizations.

An addi

tional dimension is the moral legitimacy of the powers of controlling
organizations which reflects the extent to which they promulgate be
havior consistent with basic precepts within the society.

The

criteria for moral legitimacy is as problematic for controlling or
ganizations as it is for corporations.

A response by federal con

trolling organizations to this ambiguity is the attempted institu
tionalization of cost/beenfit analyses to determine the acceptabil
ity of the activities controller organizations encourage (Tirman,
1978).

The structural and bureaucratic impediments to effective

control of corporations by controlling organizations and the charac
teristics of the relationships between organizations are reflected
in the following questions for research:
1.

Are corporations "so completely self-governing and self-

perpetuating that they must be regarded as a revolutionary species
of social organization" (McConnell, 1967, p. 249) that is beyond
the control of other organizations in society?
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2.

Do the organizational features of controlling organizations

that are important to their functional and moral legitimacy affect
the power relations between controlling organizations and corpora
tions?

The Political/Economic Context of Control

The control of economic organizations is a function of the
political/economic system and the social change that is generated by
the structural conflicts within that system.

Chambliss (1974), in

constructing a theory of social control of traditional crimes and
deviance, points out the structural biases in the legal system that
stem from the economic stratification in the society.

Best and

Connolly (1976) highlight the shortcomings of the political system
in their analysis of the state.
The institution [the state] that is legally ac
countable to the public cannot meet public needs
effectively while the private institutions that are
not so accountable consistently pursue policies at
odds with public needs (p. xi).
The positions of Chambliss and Best and Connolly reflect the
integration of the political and economic systems, an integration
that is reflected in state policies and 'non-policies' toward corpo
rate actors (Chambliss, 1974; Freitag, 1978).

The relationship be

tween corporate powers and political powers can be seen "...by
analyzing the formation, execution, and consequences of policy as well
as those 'non-policies' which fail to emerge as public issues"
(Freitag, 1978, p. 14).
Constraints on the decision-making of controlling organizations
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stem from the economic organization of societal resources (Chambliss,
1974), the structurally induced conflicts between the owners of
capital and the workers (Chambliss, 1974; Freitag, 1978), the mo
bilization of bias in the political structures that support the
construction of policies favorable to the capitalist class (Chambliss,
1974), the traditional image of the market as being beyond public con
trol (Gruchy, 1979), the ability of corporations to manipualte the
economic resources and production processes of the society (Gorz,
1967), and the commitment of the dominant class to the preservation
of the present economic system (Freitag, 1978).

The issues raised by

the conception of control implicit in the positions of these authors
include alternative views of the state, the autonomy of elites in
policy formation, and the impact of non-elites on the processes of
policy formation.
The view of the state as an instrument of the dominant members
of the society is central in the works of Domhoff (1967), Miliband
(1969), Parenti (1977) and Useem (1979a).

The existence of a power

structure is demonstrated by the political role played by the economic
elite.

Refinement of this position focuses attention on the structure

of conflicts that result in policy formation.

Freitag (1978) ex

plicitly recognizes the conflicts that arise in the relations of
production as the source of laws that favor or are inimical to the
owners of productive means.

In his formulation, the political system

reflects the struggle between the forces of production in the economic
sector; policy formation in the political system is the result of so
cial change induced by the struggle between economic classes.

The
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state, in Freitag's formulation, is a fluid construct that in the
capitalist economic system tends to support the policies of the
capitalist class.

According to Freitag, policies of the state that

do not reflect the interests of the dominant class are a result not
of the influence of economic elites on policy-formation but of
the social change that results from the struggle between capitalist
and worker interests.

In contrast, Best and Connolly (1976) and

Chambliss (1974) view the state as a class-structured entity; neith
er, however, views the state policies inimical to capitalist in
terests as the overt result of the struggle between classes in the
economic sector.

Best and Connolly dispute the overriding im

portance of class conflict in the U.S., a view expressed by Freitag
(1978)

and Gorz (1967).

According to Best and Connolly, the intra

class conflicts in both the capitalist and worker classes have me
diated against sharp inter-class conflicts and, therefore, the more
acute implications of class struggle for policy formation found in
some European nations.

The alternative view of the state presented

by Best and Connolly and Chambliss is one in which the state is a
more active participant in the political/economic structure but
within constraints imposed by the capitalist economic relations.
...it may be that the cumulative effect of necessary
state expansion into inflation and employment regula
tion, public education, public employment regula
tion, corporate research subsidies, military expendi
tures, public welfare, and highway programs itself
contributes to a crisis of state performance and le
gitimacy. ..It is perhaps more realistic to see it as
sometimes representing the public's best efforts
within the prevailing order to cope with dislocations
created by capital (Best & Connolly, 1976, pp. 27-28).
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The attempts by an active state to respond to structural deficiencies •
in the American economic system are essential to the maintenance of
the state's ideological legitimacy; inconsistencies between the
ideology of the capitalist state and the ability of the state to
meet the needs of the population in light of state policies that pro
tect capital accumulation force this issue (Sutton & Wild, 1980).
The political system is not wholly determined by the economic system;
rather, the structural conflicts in the economic system put positive
and negative constraints on the activities of the state.

In this

formulation, the state supports the interests, and in conflicts pre
serves the position, of the dominant class but as the ideological
legitimacy of the powers of economic actors is threatened, the state,
in order to perpetuate the capitalist economic relations of produc
tion, responds, to the extent necessary, to non-dominant class in
terests .
The intra-class conflicts emphasized by Eest and Connolly and
Chambliss occur in the dominant and non-dominant classes.

Competi

tion among those who own the means of production is seen.in the
examination of policy formation by Graham (1980), Kolko (1965), and
Shover (1980).

Conflicts in the dominant class result in the

utilization of state policy to increase the hegemony and capital
accumulation of the most powerful actors in the economic sector.
The non-dominant classes are also the setting for conflict and
competition.
The United States has an underclass of marginally em
ployed blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexicans whose
struggle for secure employment brings them into con-
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flict with workers in the corporate sector who seek to
protect themselves from a similar plight.' This intra
class conflict...introduces a defensive conservative
potential into the American working class (Best &
Connolly, 1976, p. 27).
The impact of non-elites on the content of policy is seen in the
political nature of the administrative functioning.

Chambliss (1974),

in his analysis of bureaucratic influences on traditional criminal
law, emphasizes the role of law enforcement bureaucratic organiza
tions in policy formation.
bureaucracies that carry out the work of the state...
may, in the last analysis be controlled by those who in
fluence the society's economic resources...but they also
have a life and force of their own which increasingly
influence what is defined as criminal or delinquent.
[This situation]. — leads to the emergence of laws which
contribute to the smooth functioning of the law-enforce
ment bureaucracy irrespective of whether or not the laws
are in the interest of society at large (pp. 27-28).
The influence of state bureaucracies on the content of the law is
based, according to Chambliss, on the assumption that they possess a
particular expertise and their abilities to perpetuate this assump
tion by controlling information processes in their domain.

The in

fluence of bureaucratic actors is tied closely to the ideological
legitimacy of the state, contributing to the general conservatism
of bureaucratic inputs into law formation (Miller, 1973).

Policy

formation in state bureaucracies supports the conception of the
state by Best and Connolly as an acting entity, rather than simply
a reflection of economic forces.
The execution of policy may serve to negate some of the in
fluences on policy formation.

The procedures by which the laws are

implemented neutralize the inputs of non-dominant members of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

society.
c r im in a l

Chambliss (1974) cites the adversary procedures of the
justice system as an example of means by which to perpetu

ate the effects of inequality in the economic system.

In the case

of laws and policy to control the economic actors in the society,
the enforcement policies may neutralize the effects of the law in
controlling behavior (Reasons & Goff, 1980).

Laws may be passed to

reduce the conflicts between groups in the society (Chambliss, 1974)
or as a result of bureaucratic interests.

The implementation of

the policies for the control of corporations, however, may be best
understood within the context of factors that affect the likelihood
that particular actors or groups of actors will be the objects of
control processes (Spitzer, 1980).

Among the factors delineated by

Spitzer are three that are particularly germane to the state con
trol of corporate structures:

the level of organization of the ac

tors, the availability of non-official control structures, and the
utility of the actors within the society.

The level of intra- and

inter-organizational development of corporations decreases the like
lihood that control structures will be utilized.

The traditional

view of the market and competition as effective structures for the
control of corporations also mitigates against state intervention
into corporate activities.

The economic, political, and social

powers of corporations allow corporations to control the range of
alternatives available in political organization, production goals
and processes, and services available, thereby increasing the de
pendence of the population on corporate actors.

Even if control

mechanisms are utilized, the availability of less stringent me-
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chanisms for corporations decreases the severity of the official
responses to corporate actors.
The powers of corporations within the political/economic con
text of decision-making by controllers raise a number of questions
for research.
1.

Do corporations control the reactions of the controllers?

2.

Do corporations exercise control directly over the acts of

the state?
3.

What are the influences of non-elites on the substance of

the law?
4.

Do the ideological, functional, and moral legitimacy of con

trollers ebb and flow with the business cycle?

The Reciprocal Relations Between Control and Power

Examination of railroad regulation by Kolko (1965) reveals that
control processes have had benefits for the very groups the regula
tion was purportedly designed to control.

Chambliss (1974) cites

the input of industry personnel into the formulation of laws dealing
with business practices.

Corporations often support federal regula

tion of their practices to alleviate their responsibilities to state
regulations and increase the predictability of controls within the
corporate environment.

Government regulation may actually serve

certification needs within particular industries (Chambliss, 1974;
Kolko, 1962) and decrease the effects of other control mechanisms,
for example, competition, on the powers of corporations.

As already

noted, control processes of the state support the capitalist economic'
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system in conflicts between groups in the society (Freitag, 1978).
Lauderdale et al. (1979) propose that when corporations attempt to
avoid negative consequences of controls the problems to be controlled
may actually be exacerbated.

Spitzer's theory of deviance includes

attention to the generation of deviance by control processes.

In the

area of the control of corporate processes there may be a similar ef
fect.

Efforts at control may actually increase the power of corpo

rations rather than diminish them.
Control policies may also involve non-decision-making (Chambliss,
1974; Freitag, 1978).

The inhibitors to the construction and implemen

tation of controls discussed in Chapter I may result in non-response
by organizations of control.

Non-decision-making processes, like

decision-making processes, may contribute to the societal perception
of increased moral and functional legitimacy of corporate powers
without any actual change in practices or consequences of corporate
involvement in the social, political, and economic institutions of
society.

Control mechanisms may result in overt benefits for the ob

jects of the control processes, as did the railroad industry as do
cumented in Kolko's study.

The official recognition that accompanies

control processes may serve to justify the role of corporate actors
in the society and thereby contribute to legitimation of their ex
traordinary powers.

The reciprocal relations between control and

corporate powers is crucial to the problem of corporate powers, given
the differential responsiveness of the state to the needs and con
cerns of the capitalist and non-capitalist classes within the nar
rowing range of options available to the state.
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The focus of research is defined by the following questions:
1.

Does control actually increase corporate power?

2.

Have the efforts of large corporations been aided by the

decisions and non-decisions of controllers?

Justice in the Control of Corporations

Quinney (1980) views justice as "inevitably shaped by social
reality:

it is an integral part of the social, economic, and po

litical structure of the society" (p. 6).

In a society based on

capitalist economic relations, justice is limited to the minimization
of discrimination and inequality in the application of the law.

Ac

cording to Quinney (1980),
This leaves wide open such questions as the concrete
meaning.of equality, the social reality of equality
and inequality, the existence of class conflict and
state power, and the struggle for a better society
beyond a narrow sense of justice (p. 7).
To the extent that the law protects the existing economic relations
and promotes the interests of the dominant class, the concerns ex
pressed by Quinney are unlikely to be addressed in the legal and
political systems.

In the view of the state put forth by Best and

Connolly (1976), the state is, to some extent, independent of the
economic system but the options of the state in promoting justice
are limited by the increasingly scarce resources of the state in the
face of rising demands for state services.
The inadequacy of capitalist formulations of justice is acute
when the problem of control of corporations is considered.

The re

liance of corporations on the formal rationality of the law for def-
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initions of corporate responsibilities (Sutton & Wild, 1980) is an
indication of the narrow conception of justice utilized in the rela
tions between state control organizations and economic corporations.
Parenti (1977) identifies several characteristics of the American
economy which contribute to corporate irresponsibility and the inade
quacy of the extent to which justice is a consideration in the con
trol of corporations.

The concentration of economic power among a

relatively small number of societal actors, the dominance over po
litical power, especially in terms of control over major institutions,
of the major corporations, and the promulgation of an individualis
tic ideology that results in the privatization of public wealth, an
emphasis on consumption rather than need fulfillment, and denial
'of responsibility for others in society are among them.
Stone (1975), in analyzing the growth of corporate influence,
attests to the autonomy of the corporation from the general society
and societal demands.

"Increasingly, the corporation could operate

where it wanted to, grow to whatever size it wanted, manufacture
any products, and provide any services it chose" (p. 22).

The in

effectiveness of the government against corporate power is reflected
in Marcus’ (1977) conclusion that "...corporate power remains es
sentially unchecked, and is likely to remain so in the forseeable fu
ture" (pp. 100-101).

The autonomy of the large corporations means

that it need not be responsive to the public interest, either in
terms of social costs or social needs, and that corporations are
relatively immune to outside control.

The definition of corporate

responsibilities may refer to the alleviation of social costs direct
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ly related to the corporation's activities or may refer to the alle
viation of social needs in general.

That corporations should at

least not add to the general needs of the society is a basic assump
tion underlying the former position.

The latter position is reflect

ed in corporate activity to promote satisfaction of public needs,
whether or not the corporation is directly associated with the need.
The accountability of the large hierarchically-ordered corpo
rations to the public interest, whether responsibility is defined
in the more narrow or more inclusive view, has been largely usurped
by the organizational rules and goals that concentrate on production
and growth.

The nebulous nature of societal goals for the U.S.

economic system makes them particularly susceptible to the influence
of corporate goals, given their greater clarity and consistency.
State control processes address the legal responsibilities of corpo
rations within the capitalist formulations of justice.

Control pro

cesses are unlikely to promote the social responsibilities of corpo
rations, given the economic and political inequality of societal ac
tors and the inability of the capitalist structure of relations to
meet the needs of all members of the society.
The dependence of corporations on the formal rationality of the
law is an indication of the extent to which definitions of social
responsibility have been narrowed to the legal responsibilities of
corporations.

An appropriate focus of research, then, is the exami

nation of corporate positions on the issue of corporate responsibil
ity in legal and social contexts.
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Summary

The foci for research delineated in this chapter are summarized:
1.

Are corporations beyond the control of other insti
tutions and organizations in the society?

2.

Do the organizational features of controlling
organizations that are important to their func
tional and moral legitimacy affect the power rela
tions between controlling organizations and cor
porations?

3.

Do corporations control the reactions of their con
trollers?

4.

Do corporations exercise control directly over the
policies of the state?

5.

Do the ideological, functional, and moral legitimacy
of controllers ebb and flow with the business cycle?

6.

What are the influences of non-elites on the substance
of the law?

7.

How do controls actually increase the powers of
corporations?

8.

How have the efforts of large corporations been
aided by the decisions and non-decisions of con
trollers?

9.

In what ways do corporations depend on legal me
chanisms for delineation of their social
responsibilities?

Methodological considerations are presented in the following chapter.
Examination of the problems presented here is conducted within the
particular relations between the Ford Motor Company and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, a controlling organization
for the American automobile industry.

The manufacture of the Ford

Pinto and Mercury Bobcat automobiles eventually resulted in the in
vocation of control processes by the NHTSA, providing an opportunity
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to study structural and organizational impediments to the effective
control of corporations, the relations between the state as a
major actor in the political system and corporations as major actors
in the economic system, the distribution of powers across these two
actors, and the extent to which justice in the control of corpora
tions is a function of a clear delineation of the legal and social
responsibilities of corporations.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The models of social organization delineated in Chapters I and
II are specified within the functionalist and radical paradigms in
Sociology.

The sets of organizing principles that constitute these

paradigms present particular models of social organization and the
appropriate focus and method of study.

According to Michalowski

(1977) paradigms define the content of research, indicate appro
priate problems for research, suggest appropriate methods for
studying the problems so defined, and represent distinct ways of
interpreting events.

The research setting and the methods utilized

for examination of the theoretical questions isolated in Chapter
II are presented within the framework established for critical
examination of the control of corporate powers.

The Research Setting

On August 10, 1978, Judy Ulrich, her sister Lynn, and their
cousin Donna Ulrich were driving on U.S. Highway 33 in Indiana when
their 1973 Ford Pinto sedan was hit from the rear.

The Pinto ex

ploded into flames, and Lynn and Donna died within minutes.

Judy,

who was thrown out of the car after being burned over 95% of her
body, died some eight hours later at a b u m center.

Pathologists’

reports, indicate that had it not been for the bums, none of the
girls would have suffered serious injury.

Even the Ford Motor

79
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Company later acknowledged that burning was the cause of death.
Indiana law had recently been rewritten so that a corporation's
failure to act on a known defect in its product or products was a
criminal offense.

Cosentino, the Elkhart County prosecutor, took

the case to the Grand Jury and on September 13, 1978, the Grand
Jury indicted the Ford Motor Company on three charges of reckless
homicide.

The case was later venued out to Pulaski County, Indiana,

and the county seat of Winamac was approved as the trial's venue.
The trial commenced on January 7, 1980.
The use of the criminal law against the Ford Motor Company in
the manufacture of the' allegedly defective Pinto and Bobcat auto
mobiles was augmented by the efforts of the federal regulatory body
for the automobile industry, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.

In May, 1978, this controlling organization made

an initial finding of defect in the Ford Pinto.

This decision set

in motion the processes by which the danger presented by the Pinto
automobile, as determined by.the National Highway*Traffic Safety Ad
ministration, could be removed from the American public and was the
culmination of a variety of events and forces germane to the study
of the control of corporate power.

The Pinto case provides the set

ting for exploration of criminal and regulatory law in the control
of corporations, the procedures for control utilized by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the organizational,
political, social, and economic powers of the Ford Motor Company to
resist control processes.
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The Research Purpose

Collection of data pertinent to institutional factors in the
development of control processes for the automobile industry, the
structure of relations that currently exist between the automobile
industry and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and
the social, legal, and economic contexts within which these relation
ships have developed is necessary.
The research design, a case study, does not allow generaliza
tion to a larger population.

This study is, however, conducive to

evaluation of the appropriateness of the research foci isolated in
the existing literature.

The detailed description permitted within

this case study is an important basis for developing scientific in
quiry into controls on corporations.

While analysis of theoretical

propositions is not possible, existing information about corpora
tions and their controllers are subjected to scrutiny.

The rarity

of criminal prosecutions of corporate actors accentuates the value
of the data for the evaluation of existing constructions of corpo
rate and controller activities and for the generation of additional
specification of the issues requiring research attention.

Data Collection Procedures

The sources of data for this research are both primary and
secondary.

Secondary sources present information mediated by the

author of the source and include published and unpublished materials
concerning the automobile industry, the National Highway Traffic
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Safety Administration, and the Pinto trial.

Primary materials are

original accounts that have not been described or interpreted by
another author or social scientist.

The primary materials utilized

in this research have four sources:

the observations of the re

searcher, specifically those of the trial processes that occurred in
the prosecution of the Ford Motor Company, documents distributed
within and between the Ford Motor Company and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, published records of the laws and pro
cedures guiding the control of the American automobile industry,
and interviews with individuals within the organizations involved.
A comprehensive understanding of the state control mechanisms
utilized in this case is enhanced by the qualitative nature of this
research.

The use of qualitative methods, rather than those em

phasizing quantification and statistical analysis, allows the input
of a wide range of factors into the conclusions of the researcher.
Assessment of the validity of the information and the reliability of
the techniques used in data collection, however, present challenges
unique to qualitative methods.
Threats to reliability and validity vary with the particular
technique utilized.

For this reason, Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and

Sechrest (1966) advocate the utilization of multiple methods.

In

this research, the utilization of.observations, interviews, and do
cument analysis helps to offset the variety of threats to the
validity of the data inherent in any one of these techniques.

The

problems of interview effects and reactive effects on the part of
the respondent which threaten the reliability of the interview data,
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the problems of selective observation and interpretation and contami
nation of the research setting that threaten the validity and re
liability of the court observation data, and the problems of selec
tive deposit and selective survival which threaten the validity of
the documentary data may be overcome, at least in part, according
to Webb et al. by triangulation of the measurement processes.

Con

sensus in the data gathered from multiple procedures increases the
confidence of the researcher that the conclusions generated in the
research are not systematically biased.

Triangulation contributes

to the establishment of pragmatic validity (Phillips, 1971) and
equivalency reliability (Walizer & Wienir, 1978), both of which are
dependent on consistency of the results achieved by different measures.
Qualitative research does require special attention to the
values of the authors of data sources.

Explicit recognition of value

positions allows the researcher to utilize the philosophical posi
tions of the authors as additional data for the research.

The non

reactivity of the documentary data, while eliminating a possible
threat to the reliability and validity of the data, means that the
information is not necessarily focused on the research problem, es
pecially since the documents have been produced for some purpose other
than the research.

The high dross rate that results, however, is

mitigated by the concomitant advantage of independence of the data
source.

Although there are sources of bias in every data collection

method, the existence of overlapping data and the resulting availa
bility of cross-checks allows greater confidence in the conclusions
generated by the data.

Since the availability of data on the con
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trol-of corporations is restricted, replication of studies in this
area is difficult.
ever, can the

Only with the accumulation of information, how

reliability and validity of the research processes

be accurately assessed.

Explication of the Primary Data Sources

The primary data sources for this research are trial observa
tions, documents pertaining to the Pinto case, records of the legal
procedures within which controlling organizations operate, and in
terviews.

The data from these sources, supplemented by data from

secondary sources, are used to examine the research questions de- '
lineated in Chapter II.

Such an examination is, of course, limited

by the scope of the data available.

The obstacles to effective re

search on corporations have been overcome, to some extent, by the
increased accessibility to corporate information afforded by the
criminal prosecution of Ford.
The trial of the Ford Motor Company on charges of reckless
homicide lasted thirteen weeks.

The successful defense of the cor

poration revealed information about corporate operations, and more
importantly for this study, the interactions between the Ford Motor
Company and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The

testimony of Ford executives and employees produced information on
the corporate structure, the corporate reactions to the criminal and
regulatory charges, and the corporate view of its social, legal, and
economic responsibilities.

Of particular interest is the ability

of the corporation to neutralize information procedures within the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
prosecution.
Documentary data include in-house memos between Ford em
ployees, correspondence between the Ford Motor Company and the Na
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration, trial briefs and
transcripts from civil cases involving the Ford Motor Company and the
integrity of the Pinto fuel tank, and written interactions between
consumers, consumer groups, and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration♦ Although many of the documents became available to
the public as a result of the prosecution of Ford, they were produced
independently of the trial process.

It is not possible to know

whether additional documents that pertain to corporate and control
ling activities in this case exist.

The researcher is dependent on

the skills and enthusiasm with which the prosecutor, various product
liability lawyers, and officials of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration carried out the responsibilities of their posi
tions .
The regulatory laws pertinent to this study are the procedures
instituted by Congress within which actions by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration must take place and the standards
instituted by this controlling agency for fuel tank integrity.

Of

particular importance is the input of bureaucratic elements into
the law-making process and the pragmatic application of the law to
the automobile industry.

These laws and procedures represent insti

tutionalized reactions of the controlling organization to other ac
tors in the environment, including giant corporations within the
industry it is mandated to control.
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Interviews with Joan Claybrook, recent administrator of the Na
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Michael A. Cosentino,
prosecutor of Elkhart County and of the Pinto case, are particularly
germane to this study.

In both of these interviews, the philosophi

cal issues underlying the respective control processes were addressed.
The more focused approach of the interviews produced more direct
attention to the issues of control than is provided by the documents.
Additionally, the interviews are especially valuable as cross-checks
on other sources of information.

The Data

Qualitative methods are used to study the research problem de
lineated in Chapter I.

The data and their implications are presented

in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV

CONSIDERATION OF THE DATA

The research questions delineated in Chapter II address the or
ganizational framework within which corporate powers and controlling
powers are utilized, the impact of the political economy on the
exercise of these powers, and the reciprocal relationships between
corporate power and controls.

The information gathered in this study

illuminates major issues in the control of corporate actors and
allows further examination of the conclusions drawn from the exist
ing literature, especially in terms of the ramifications of these
conclusions for state and social control of corporate power.

The

research design does not allow quantitative analysis of the interac
tions between corporate and Controlling powers.

This research does,

however, constitute a preliminary step in the delineation of the
interactive effects of corporate and controlling organizations.

The Organizational Context of Corporate and Controlling Powers

Because of the organizational characteristics of corporations.,
they enjoy some advantages over other actors in the society.

Central

to these advantages is the ability of the corporation to translate
its economic powers into political and social powers.

The extent

to which the large corporations are vulnerable to the controlling
powers of other societal organizations is contingent upon the or
ganizational characteristics of corporations, especially in terms of
87
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of the powers derived from these characteristics;- The ability of
the corporation to influence other powerful actors in the society
is a central consideration in the research questions addressing the
organizational context of corporations and controllers.
Are corporations, by virtue of their organizational
power, beyond the control of other institutions and or
ganizations in the society?
Do the organizational features of controlling organiza
tions affect the power relations between controlling
organizations and corporations?
The organizational powers of the Ford Motor Company may be
unique to that company or may be tied to characteristics of the auto
mobile industry as a whole.
ling

i n f lu e n c e s

The susceptibility of Ford to control

may, in fact, be a function of this particular com

pany in the structure of automobile sales and production.

A related

issue is the economic position of Ford as it directly affects its
political and social powers.

The Powers of the Ford Motor Company

The bureaucratic features that characterize large economic or
ganizations and that result in a division of labor consistent with
greater efficiency in the accomplishment of corporate objectives
have important implications for the Ford Motor Company.

The domi

nance of the Ford organization by members of the Ford family since
the origin of the company has tempered, to some extent, the advan
tages of a more bureaucratic arrangement.

Callahan (1979), for

example, cites the lack of independent thinking, the competitive
environment within the company, and the emphasis placed on financial
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experts over other decision-makers within the Ford organization.
Callahan refers to:
...Ford's deity-like role in the company which stifles
independent thinking and causes a stampede toward any
position the chairman is even suspected of holding
[and] ...Ford's management philosophy of putting people
and groups in competition with one another (p. 9).
The implication of Callahan's position is that Ford's internal
structure is not used as effectively as it might be for the accumula
tion of resources and, more importantly, for the internal control
of corporate activities.

That the management structure of Ford is

an important consideration in both of these processes is supported
historically by Rae (1965) and White (1971).

"The company [Ford

during the depression] was run by an aged despot, who despised sys
tematic organization and who believed in keeping his executives, in
cluding his own son, constantly in conflict with each other" (Rae,
1965, p. 115).

In the views of these analysts, the organizational

powers of Ford may have been lessened by the tendency of the company
to reject management principles that have contributed to the powers
of giant corporations.

White, especially, emphasizes this point in

his comparisons between Ford and General Motors.
Ford does, however, enjoy advantages over other actors in the
society, advantages that may implicitly or explicitly decrease the
vulnerability of the company to external controlling processes.
The size of the corporation itself has been proposed as a factor
in its ability to withstand external forces (Davids, 1967) and
even internal mechanisms at odds with efficient corporate function
ing (Rae, 1965).

In 1976 the net profit of Ford exceeded 983 mil
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lion dollars with total revenues of nearly $29 billion (Counter
Information Services, p. 12).

In 1978 the total revenues of the

company reached $42 billion (Callahan, 1979, p. 9).

Ford employes

nearly a half-million people world wide and produces an average of
12.2 cars per employee annually (Counter Information Services, p.
12).
Vertical integration within the automobile industry is perhaps
best illustrated by Ford.

The production of steel and glass by the

company represents attempts to be independent, to the extent possi
ble, of suppliers.

Vertical integration increases the control over

production processes, decreases the likelihood of exploitation by
a supplier, and brings additional profits to the auto manufacturers
from the supply of replacement parts (White, 1971, p. 80).

Complete

vertical integration in the auto industry is neither possible nor
desirable, according to White, given the expertise necessary and
the increased risks of internal supply.

Integration in the auto

mobile industry is characterized by White as tapered integration,
allowing the auto companies to reap the benefits of integration
without suffering some of its negative consequences.

This may be

seen in the development of new components and the utilization of
technology in problem solving.
On some components, there has been a tendency to let
suppliers develop a product, purchase it for a while,
and then either purchase the plant or build one for
in-house production. This, of course, shifts the
risks of development on to the suppliers...General
Motors has had a greater tendency to initiate such
projects in-house. This seems to be. due primarily to
a greater willingness on General Motors’ part to ab
sorb risk in these areas...(White, 1971, p. 85).
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Ford has also found advantage in its transnational operations.

CIS

discusses this advantage in terms of the productivity of Ford em
ployees .
In order to extract greater productivity (more work for
the same pay) from its employees, Ford play workforces
off against one another...The increased globalization
which is the hallmark of current.Ford strategy has now
added a new dimension to the company's offensive...Com
plementation— the assembly of a single product or model
from components made in different countries or plants—
has been developed further by Ford than by any other
company...In the battle between workers and company
the workers remain fragmented organizationally by
geography and nationality. Ford, on the other hand,
benefits from its centralized control of management
strategy (Counter Information Services, p. 1).
The critical stance of the CIS is clear in its discussion of Ford
overseas operations.

That Ford enjoys advantages from its transna

tional organization and vertical integration is a conclusion supported
by many analysts.

Ford's international structure allows it to weather

economic lows in any particular national economy.
Ford's biggest problem is its North American Automotive
Operations. Traditionally the profit core of the com
pany, the division has been in a tailspin...Ford lost
$735 million in the U.S. in the second quarter, pri
marily because of poor car and truck sales...But Ford
has a lot of cushion during hard times. Its overseas
automotive operations, though suffering from Japanese
competition and Europe's recession, are still considered
strong...David Eisenberg, automotive analyst for Sanford
C. Bernstein & Co., says the strength of Ford's foreign
and non-automotive subsidiaries will bring earnings
'well in excess' of $2.4 billion by 1983-84— which will
be record profits..." (Lenhoff, 1980, p. 1C).
Conglomeration, a process cited by Clinard and Yeager (1980) as
contributing to the overall powers of giant corporations is of less
importance in the case of Ford than many other multinational corpo
rations.

White (1971) estimates that Ford automotive sales, in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92
eluding passenger cars, trucks, and tractors, constitutes over
90% of Ford sales (p. 90).

Ford, through its Philco line, sells

home appliances, computers, and electronic systems.

Ford is cur

rently the largest producer of satellite systems (Counter Informa
tion Services).

In 1965, according to White, these items con

tributed 5% of Ford’s total sales.

Ford sales to the Department of

Defense also constitute a relatively small percent of the Ford
earnings (less than 5%), but, according to Congressman Lee Aspin,
whose study of defense contractors was conducted in 1973, Ford ranks
28th among Department of Defense contractors (Aspin, 1973).

Ford’s

position within the auto industry is a solid second and has been
since the early 1950s.

In 1975, according to the Automobile Manu

facturers Association, Ford produced about 26% of the cars manufac
tured by American automobile companies.

This compares to approxi

mately 54% for General Motors and 17% for Chrysler.

The position of

the company within the industry is protected by practices of the
automobile industry as a whole.

The delay of introduction of new

technology by any one manufacturer may protect the market and other
companies within the oligopolistic industry.
Suppose that an oligopolist sees a profitable market
niche for a product. The development of the product
and tooling up for production require a large invest
ment, and a significant scale of production relative
to the size of the market is required to recoup this
investment. Under these circumstances, a single
oligopolist might well refrain from developing this
product until he was sure that enough room existed for
himself and his rivals to produce it at a reasonable
profit (White, 1971, p. 175, emphasis in original).
The automobile industry is, therefore, characterized by lack of pro
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duct competition as well as lack of price competition.

Planned

obsolescence of the automotive product, frequent model and styling
changes, and influence over consumer demands serve to protect the
automotive industry as a whole.

The vulnerability of the American

automobile industry, however, to competition from smaller foreign
models, however, must also be considered.

Between 1965 and 1977

the percentage of total passenger car retail sales represented by
imports more than doubled.

The reluctance of American manufac

turers to enter the small car market can be seen in White's (1971)
presentation of the historical trends in this area.
The companies, in fact, chose to continue develop
ment on a leisurely basis...They were concerned that
their own small cars might simply divert customers from
their more expensive, more profitable models. The in
vestment in the new cars would be substantial, and the
companies wanted to assure themselves that the market
was large enough for all three firms. Edward N. Cole,
then head of the Chevrolet Division, stated that the
small car market would have to reach a size of 500,000
units before General Motors would be interested in en
tering. Since General Motors fully expected its rivals
to enter also, Cole was implicitly stating a 'roomfor-all' proposition (White, 1971, pp. 183-184).
White cites the quality of the Volkswagen automobile and its service
division for its success in the small car market (1971, p. 185)
refuting American industry claims of the diminishing quality of cars
as the costs are reduced.

When, in 1967, the American manufacturers

made plans to enter the small car market, market competition, rather
than technological competition, dominated the process.
At least as early as 1967, the evidence on import
sales indicated that the market for a new generation
of small cars was large enough to support all the
domestic producers. Ford, making the first expensive
commitment on tooling for the Maverick in mid-1967,
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was the first to recognize this. This was consistent
with its role as an ambitious seeker of new market
niches that it could exploit profitably before its
rivals caught up (White, 1971, p. 188).
Competition for market share provides a basis for activities by Ford
that resulted in the eventual application of control mechanisms.
The powers of the Ford Motor Company, as an autonomous corpo
ration and as a member of the automobile industry, are important
factors to consider in the examination of attempts by other organiza
tions to control its activities in the society.

The characteristics

of large corporations and the powers that are associated with these
characteristics are evidence of and factors in the ability of the
corporation to control information about its functioning.

The trial

of the Ford Motor Company provides an example of the ability of
large corporations to protect the flow of information about their
internal environments during control processes.

The interactions

between Ford and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
provide a focus for further examination'of corporate attempts to in
crease its immunity to control processes.

Controlling Organizations and Their Powers

Attempts to control the activities of the Ford Motor Company
through criminal prosecution and regulation provide an opportunity
to examine the susceptibility of controlling powers to the influence
of corporate powers.

Although the court has historically been im

portant in the control of corporate actors (Elkins, 1976), struc
tures and processes characteristic of the criminal court decrease
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the effectiveness of its control over corporate organizations.

The

legal limitations on the scope of judicial activities in this area
may be illustrated in the Pinto trial.
The corporate defendent, like the individual defendent, is en
titled to safeguards of due process and evidentiary right, for exam
ple, protection against the introduction of hearsay evidence and
protection against the introduction of evidence not directly related
to the particular incident that resulted in the charges of reckless
homicide.

These safeguards enabled the corporation to effectively

shield its internal decision-making processes from public view.

Two

court rulings are examples of the protection afforded the organiza
tion in this case.
1.

Former Ford employees were not allowed, within the safe

guards afforded the defendent, to testify about the topics or results
of meetings between Ford executives on the production of the Ford
Pinto unless that employee actually attended the meeting in question.
If the employee's knowledge resulted from memoranda not introduced
into evidence at the trial or from personal accounts of other em
ployees at the meeting, the information was not allowable, under the
hearsay rule.

In order to demonstrate culpability of Ford, the pro

cesses by which the alledgedly defective Ford Pinto was manufac
tured needed to be exposed.

The organizational characteristics of

the defendent served to diminish exposure of the timing and nature
of the decisions that resulted in the manufacture of the Pinto.
While the Pinto trial provided some insights into the workings of
the Ford organization, the ability of the corporation to maintain
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secrecy about its operations remained largely intact.

The legiti

macy of judicial powers requires that the court establish and fol
low rules of evidence.

The strict structure in which this occurs

is evidenced by Ford defense attorney James Neal's statement in
objection to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution about
the capability of Ford to manufacture a safer car.

"What concerns

me is that this case might turn into a broad general examination of
the auto industry, which is outside the scope of a criminal case"
(State of Indiana vs. Ford, 1980).
2.

The court ruled that the internal Ford documents in posses

sion of the prosecutor had to be authenticated by the source of the
document in order for the document to be admissable.

When the pro

secution argued that production of the documents by Ford (in re
sponse to subpeonas) amounts to authentication, attorneys responded
that since the corporation does not admit authenticity, it remains
at issue.

Malcolm Wheeler, an attorney for the Ford Motor Company,

argued that unless the state establishes (1) the validity of the
signature on the document and (2) that the purported recipient
of the document actually received it, the foundation for authenticity
has not been laid (State of Indiana vs. Ford, 1980).

The court ac

cepted this argument even though the documents were produced from
Ford files.

Justification for the court’s ruling came from Wheeler

when he argued that anyone (for example, a janitor) could have put
the documents into the Ford files.

The court’s decision is based on

the rules established for burden of proof, which for this particular
issue fell on the prosecutor.
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As a result of the Pinto prosecution, a number of internal
documents were available to the public and negotiations between the
Ford Motor Company and the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis
tration were publicized.

The importance of the event and the data

it provided, however, is highlighted by its uniqueness.

The strict

structure of presentation of evidence necessitated by the require
ments of judicial legitimacy is an important aspect of the powers
of controllers to control the activities of corporate actors.
The characteristics of regulatory bodies that influence the
effect of controllers on corporate policies may also be examined
within the context of safety regulations promulgated by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The NHTSA (originally the

National Highway Safety Bureau) was established by the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.

This act is "to pro

vide for a coordinated national safety program and establishment,
of safety standards for motor vehicles in interstate commerce to
reduce accidents involving motor vehicles and to reduce the deaths
and injuries occurring in such accidents" ("National Traffic and
Motor," 1974).

The importance of the statutory basis of the NHTSA

is highlighted in a November, 1977, letter from Ralph Nader to Joan
Claybrook, then the agency's administrator.
...the role established for NHTSA in the 1966 statute
was not that of supportive staff for the Secretary [of
the Department of Transportation]. Congressman James
MacKay, with whom you worked in 1966, successfully
obtained Congressional approval of NHTSA as a statutory
agency. That meant NHTSA was established by statute,
not by administrative decree, for the purpose of giving
the agency a degree of independence...that befits its
regulatory mission. Although the statute's authority
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is delegated to NHTSA by the Secretary, the Administra
tive Procedures Act and the auto safety law call for a
reasonable insulation...between NHTSA and the Secretary"
(Nader, 1977, p. 2).
The independence of controlling organizations from politically
based organizations is an important consideration.

The NHTSA does

operate within the Department of Transportation and so does not en
joy the autonomy from executive control afforded the independent
regulatory agencies and commissions.

The impact of the NHTSA posi

tion is underscored by the decision of Neil Goldschmidt, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation, on the recall of Ford
Motor Company cars with transmissions that alledgedly slip out of
park.

In an interview on the MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Secretary

Goldschmidt was asked if he had overruled a recommendation for a re
call of the affected cars.

His reply, "NHTSA originally recommended

on part of that total recall, and my guess is they would have been
happier that it came out that way.

I didn't agree with their judg

ment" (Goldschmidt Interview, 1981), reveals the restraints on the
activities of NHTSA by the Department of Transportation.

Secretary

Goldschmidt's decision on this issue was made despite the fact that
a safety defect was found.

During the same interview he stated, "And

we found a safety defect [in the automatic transmissions of some 16
million Fords].

We never took that finding back:

it is still sit

ting there in the record" (Goldschmidt Interview, 1981).
The position of NHTSA in the Department of Transportation is one
reason for NHTSA inactivity in the safety program and recommendations
by congressional committees for a restructuring of safety agencies.
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The politicization of highway safety decisions is widely acknowledged
by consumer groups, Congressional committees, and media personnel.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety reports the findings of
the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Commerce
Committee.
Sharply criticizing the 'virtual halt' of the federal
motor vehicle safety program 'over the past two years,'
[the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee] has
recommended that the program be revitalized by removing
it from the Department of Transportation and placing it,
along with the Food and Drug Administration and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, in a new, independent
regulatory agency■("Virtual Halt," 1976, p. 1).
This same subcommittee, however, cites a variety of other factors
in the decreasing rate of NHTSA rule-making actions.
1.

The increasing complexity of the development and
promulgation of safety standards.

John Snow, administrator of the NHTSA in 1976, agreed with the obser
vation that standards issued in the early years of the NHTSA's exis
tence were dependent on already existing technology.

Newer standards,

according to Snow, "require more intense analysis, and research, and
stimulate more resistance on the part of industry.

In that context,

new standards do take longer to move from the proposed stage to the
final rule" ("Virtual Halt," 1976).

The report of an ad hoc committee

to study the Cumulative Regulatory Effects on the Cost of Automotive
Transportation (RECAT) utilizes the complexity of the regulatory
situation as an argument for (rather than a justification of) less
regulation.
Early safety standards reflected the state of the art
of motor, vehicle design; hence they were cheaply and
easily met and cost effective. However, the reservoir
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of cheap and easy beneficial changes appears to be
running dry. Some recent standards require motor
vehicle performance whose attainment is conjectural,
whose costs may not be predictable, and whose achieve
ment may involve substantial research and development
efforts (Ad Hoc Committee, 1972, p. xii).
2.

Lack of public support for particular rule-making
actions.

Public support for safety, however, is reflected in a survey conduct
ed by Hart Research Associates, Inc. for the Department of Transpor
tation.

According to this survey, "safety is one of the most im

portant concerns the public has in buying a new car" ("Surveys Show
Consumers," 1978, p. 1).

This factor may be directly related to

particular practices within regulatory bodies.

Public support for

specific regulation may be related to the perceived effectiveness of
the agency or regulation in representing the public interest.

When,

for example, the Environmental Protection Agency considered proce
dures for exclusion of information from public review, a variety of
manufacturers were represented.

The conflict between the need for

protection of corporate competitive information and the public's
right to know resulted in a ruling by the agency that two bases for
exclusion of information from public files existed:

(1) extreme

sensitivity for industrial competition and (2) that the information
was not essential to the public interest (decided, apparently, by
negotiation between the E.P.A. and the petitioning manufacturer).
Representation of the public interest is undermined since E.P.A.
regulations do not require separation of arguments based on compe
titive factors and those considering the necessity of public access.
The result is that the public cannot challenge the decisions of re-
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quired confidentiality on the basis of necessity of public access
(Wilson, 1972)•

That the NHTSA may also be overzealous in the pro

tection of corporate information is indicated by the finding of the
Center for Auto Safety that some documents kept out of the public
file on the "trade secret" basis have already been made public via
court proceedings, media exposure, etc. (Ditlow & Meyer, 1978).
3.

The political interference of other governmental
bodies in the NHTSA rule-making process.

The Office of Management and Budget, for example, in 1971 required
notification of action by regulatory bodies and a summary descrip
tion of:
- the principle objectives of the regulations, stand
ards , guidelines, etc.;
- alternatives to the proposed actions that have been
considered;
- a comparison of the expected benefits or accomplish
ments and the costs (Federal and non-Federal) associa
ted with the alternatives considered; and
- the reasons for selecting the alternative that is
proposed (Heffelfinger, 1971, p. 2).
While such requirements may increase interagency coordination, although
they do not in and of themselves assure it, they also increase the
burdens on regulatory rule-making actions.

Interference by other

governmental bodies in the regulatory functions of agencies may en
courage as well as impede the regulatory process.

A brief history of

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301 illustrates:
...in 1967, the National Highway Traffic Safety Bureau...
issued an advanced notice of proposed rule-making an
nouncing its plans to amend the standard to require
lateral and rear-end collision tests, prevention of
fuel spillage due to rollover, puncture resistant fuel
tanks, and protection of fuel lines and fittings.
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Over a year later, a notice of proposed rulemaking was issued proposing lateral and rear barrier
impact tests of 20 mph with a January 1, 1970 effec
tive date. Unfortunately, this proposal was never
adopted.
Over a year and a half later, on August 24, 1970,
the NHTSA issued another notice of proposed rulemaking
that would tighten the requirements of the earlier
proposal and add a 30 mph rear barrier impact. How
ever, it would delay the effective date of most of the
requirements to January 1, 1972, except the 30 mph rear
barrier impact whose effective date was to be January
1, 1973.
After two years of NHTSA inaction, the Center for
Auto Safety petitioned HNTSA on July 3, 1972, to issue
an upgraded standard. While the petition was not re
jected, no action was forthcoming. On May 29, 1973,
the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety's film "Cars
that Crash and Burn" was shown to the House Subcommittee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
As a result of the showing, bills were introduced
to upgrade the fuel system requirements. The NHTSA
responded by isstiing another notice of proposed rulemaking which substantially reiterated its 1970 notice
and asked for comment.
Nearly a year later in the face of continued
Congressional scrutiny and strong pressure from con
sumer and industry groups, the NHTSA again issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking remarkably similar to
the 1973 notice. On October 27, 1974, the Motor Vehi
cle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974 were signed
into law incorporating FMVSS 301 as it was published
in the March 21, 1974 notice fixing the effective dates,
and prohibiting future amendments that would degrade
the standard. This ended seven years of bureaucratic
delay ("Fuel-Fed," 1978, pp. 33-34).
A report on the effects of regulation on the automobile industry
(RECAT), prepared for the Office of Science and Technology, argues
against the imposition of many regulatory standards for auto safety
(in particular, the air bag) (Ad Hoc Committee, 1972).

Since the

preparers of the report were all appointed by President Nixon, a mem
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ber of Senator Muskie's staff explicitly recognized the collusion
between the White House and the automobile suspected by others.
"The report recognizes not the needs of the public but the limited
talents of the automobile industry" ("A Backlash Against," 1972).
The timing of the report is especially revealing.
Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety questions the
curious sequence of events that occurred about the timethe study began. Last April 27 [1971], accompanied
by Ford Motor Co. President Lee Iococca, Henry Ford II
met with President Nixon to discuss 'matters relating
to the auto industry.' Ford denies suggesting RECAT,
but two days later a White House memorandum circulated
throughout various federal departments proposing a .cost
study. Now shortly before oral arguments on the airbag
regulation are scheduled to begin in the Cincinnati
Federal Appeals Court, RECAT pops up. This week Iococca
said 'the report comes none too soon' to show the
dangers of boosting consumer costs without carefully
considering the nation's economy ("A Backlash Against,"
1972).
NHTSA enforcement actions, too, must be considered within the bureau
cratic characteristics of the agency.

While the agency has subpeona

power (Karr & Apcar, 1978; Nader, 1977) and recourse to civil penal
ties and injunctions (Bradford, 1978), resistance to the application
of its standards may be stiff.

The long process involved in recall

decisions is illustrated by Karr and Apcar (1978) in an article in
the Wall Street Journal.
Auto-recall decisions, often costly and controversial,
don't just happen overnight. Many months of backstage
maneuvering may precede the final move. When a serious
safety issue is involved, the process may start with
news stories or car-owner complaints; then may come
lengthy government investigation and testing, consumer
group pressure for government action, resistance by the
car’s manufacturer, an official finding of a safety
defect, and a conflict between the company and Washington
over planned repairs" (Karr & Apcar, 1978).
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The voluntary recall by Ford of the Ford Pintos and Mercury Bobcats
followed an investigation by the NHTSA that began September 13,
1977, and culminated in an initial finding of defect in the Ford
Pinto (1970-1976) and Mercury Bobcat (1975-76) on May 8, 1978.

The

publication of an article by Mark Dowie in Mother Jones entitled
"Pinto Madness" was a major force in the initiation of the investiga
tion; the NHTSA investigation of the Pinto specifically addressed the
charges levied by Dowie against the Ford Motor Company ("Alleged
Fuel Tank," 1978).

In the process of investigation, the NHTSA con

sidered consumer inputs, information from Ford, and information from
the Canadian Ministry of Transport on parallel cases in Canada.

As

the basis for its ultimate determination in the Pinto case NHTSA col
lected technical information on the engineering and production of the
Pinto, tabulated accident statistics on the involvement of the
Pinto in relevant accidents and comparison data for other cars, and
with crash tests generated information on the performance of the Pinto
in terms of fuel system integrity.

Public interest in the case is in

dicated by the 900 plus public inquiries and comments received by
NHTSA in the course of the investigation ("Alleged Fuel Tank," 1978).
The procedural and pragmatic constraints within which NHTSA operates
also includes its responsibility for performance rather than design
criteria in the implementation of standards, the control of pertinent
information by the organizations it is attempting to control, and
the difficulty in determining the adequacy of lead time necessary
for the implementation of the standards.
That compliance with*standard 301 is evaluated according to per-
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formance rather than design is attested to by Ralph Hitchcock, then
acting director of the Office of Crashworthiness Motor vehicle pro
gram, when he writes, "Use of [particular] devices...in which fuel
tanks, however, is completely up to the manufacturer of the vehi
cle... This standard is performance, rather than design, oriented.
In other words the manufacturer may use whatever design he chooses
as long as the performance requirements are achieved" (Hitchcock,
1977).

While this does not necessarily impede the effectiveness of

the NHTSA, it can have several implications for the control of cor
porations.

Performance criteria require the crash-testing of auto

mobiles for their evaluation.

Performance criteria maintain industry

control over the technological developments in safety.

Performance

criteria severely limit the effect other individuals and organiza
tions could have on the solution to problems of automotive safety..
Frustration with this situation is expressed by J. R. Doughty, direc
tor of the Canadian Bureau of Traffic Engineering when he says,
We further understand that the FMVSS [Federal Motor
Vehical Safety Standards] are performance rather than
design oriented and that the use of specific designs
cannot be specified. Therefore, it appears that these
manufacturers, on their own volition, chose an un
satisfactory solution which is now being rectified by
requiring the motoring public to further risk their
lives
(Doughty, 1974).
The dependence of NHTSA on the industry it is mandated to con
trol for information about its compliance with federal standards may
also put the agency at a disadvantage.

This information is important

in determination of the range of data available to auto companies and,
therefore, their abilities to meet federal safety standards as well
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as in the determination of industry efforts to comply with the stand
ards.

While the NHTSA investigation of the Pinto case reveals that a

variety of sources of information may be utilized, some of the most
important data come from the auto companies themselves.

The impor

tance of the timing of standards is indicated by the emphasis in the
RECAT report on timing the effective dates of standards so that
standard implementation is compatible with the cycles of automotive
production.

It is also indicated by the negative consequences of

delayed standard implementation.

That such negative consequences

are recognized by the federal government is indicated by the 1978 de
cision of the General Services Administration to remove Pintos from
service until modifications could be made ("Surveys Show Consumers,"
1978).

The process of standard implementation is described in a let

ter from American Motors to Dr. James Gregory, NHTSA administrator,
in 1975.

The framework for participation described in this letter is

likely to delay the final effective date of standards set by the
federal government and increase the uncertainty within which the
agency and the industry operate.

While public and industry input

into the standards are essential for legitimation of NHTSA's actions,
there are costs associated with this process.
Within this regulation is contained the framework for
active participation in the rulemaking process. Ac
cordingly, the Administrator is to solicit and review
comments pertaining to any proposed rule before pro
ceeding with further rulemaking. He may then, at his
prerogative, decide to conduct further research, isuse a new and related notice of proposed rulemaking,
finalize the rule as proposed, terminate all action.
Even when rulemaking is finalized, the Regulation pro
vides for interested parties to petition the Administra
tor to reconsider, amend, or revoke any standard or
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part thereof. This entire procedure is designed to allow
the exchange of ideas and suggestions throughout the
development of a new standard so that the intent of the
Safety Act, i.e., to provide standards that are prac
ticable, objective, and meet the needs of motor vehicle
safety, is realized. Until joint participation in the
rulemaking process is completed and a final rule is pub
lished, the performance criteria, test procedures, required
lead time, etc., are subject to change. Thus, it is only
upon finalization of the rule that the Administration can:
1.

Determine a reasonable and practicable effec
tive date, and

2.

Expect the automotive industry to initiate
necessary production engineering programs.

Upon review by American Motors, we found that approximate
ly 250 different dockets have been opened with proposed
rulemaking since the adoption of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. From this group,
58 standards and regulations have been adopted. Twentyfive dockets have been officially withdrawn. Others re
main active pending NHTSA action (Stewart, 1975).
Bureaucratic and organizational implications for the control of
corporations are seen in the interactions between the Ford Motor Com
pany and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

The

position of Ford within the auto industry and the resources it com
mands by virtue of its size and organization serve to shield it from
outside interference.

The susceptibility of Ford to outside con

trol by judicial and regulatory organizations is further decreased
by constraints on the organizational behavior that are designed to
ensure the maintenance of their legitimacy as controlling organiza
tions.

While the eventual recall of the Pinto, in direct response

to the NHTSA investigation, indicates that Ford is not beyond the
control of other organizations in the society, the manufacture of
nearly 2 million defective cars over a period of six years indicates
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that the impacts of controls are mitigated, to various degrees, by
the characteristics discussed here.

Furthermore, these factors pro

vide the framework for corporate influence over controllers, the
focus of research question 3, and corporate influence on policies
of control, the focus of research questions 4.
Do corporations control the reactions of their control
lers?
Do corporations exercise control over state policies?

The Political/Economic Context of Control

The relations between corporations and controllers within the
political and economic structures in which they operate are exempli
fied by the interactions between Ford and the NHTSA.

The impact of

Ford on state' structures and processes is emphasized in this section.
The contributions of non-corporate actors to the process of control
and to inhibition of control efforts are also taken into account.

Corporations and Controllers

Mechanisms for corporate influence over the reactions of con
trolling organizations to corporate activities include efforts to
delay the implementation of standards, efforts to alleviate negative
consequences of the application of standards, and efforts to influence
other organizations in the environments of controlling organizations.
Examples of the utilization of these mechanisms by Ford are presented
here.

The stakes in the Pinto case were high for both the control

ling organizations and the corporations, especially given the public
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attention focused on the case.

These examples, therefore, serve to

illustrate the importance of legitimacy to corporations and control
ling organizations.

Delay in Standard Implementation

Counter Information Services cites corporate techniques designed
to delay the implementation of standards and asserts that such tech
niques were utilized by Ford in the delay of standard 301.
There are several main techniques in the art of com
bating a government safety standard: a) make your ar
guments in succession so the feds can be working on
disproving only one at a time; b) claim that the real
problem is not X but Y [for example, the problems of
auto- safety stem not from automobile design but from
drivers]...; c) no matter how rediculous each argument
is, accompany it with thousands of pages of highly
technical assertions it will take the government months
or, preferably, years to test. Ford's large and active
Washington office brought these techniques to new heights
and became the envy of the lobbyists' trade (Counter
Information Services, 1978, p'. 13).
The delaying tactics of Ford involved arguments concerning the
inaccessibility of data required by NHTSA, the inappropriateness of
testing procedures established for the standard, and the costs of
compliance with these standards.

In addition. Ford presented argu

ments concerning the public accessibility of information relating to
the case and its right to protection of confidentiality.

According

to Mark Dowie, author of the article Pinto Madness, "Ford admits op
posing certain testing procedures in the rulemaking process which
they now claim were excessive.

The record shows, however, that they

were only excessive for the Pinto and the Mercury Bobcat and that
Ford produced models of similar size and weight in factories around
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the world that would meet the standards.

We can only conclude,

therefore, that their opposition to rear end standards was simply
designed to forestall the day when they would have to make 'exces
sive' alterations on the rear end of the Pinto (Dowie, 1978).
The efforts expended by Ford in delaying tactices, it would seem,
might have been spent in complying with the standards in the first
place.

Mark Dowie presents the corporate logic against this posi

tion as well.
When faced with the Pinto question Ford's official
response remains that the car did meet all existing
federal standards at the time it was introduced. True,
but it did not meet standards for rear end collisions
because there weren't any in 1970 when the Pinto was in
troduced. There were proposed standards which Ford
had been busy lobbying against. Instead of re-tooling
the car to meet the proposed standard which they proved
in their own tests they could do with the Capri, Ford
decided at the highest levels of the company to continue
fighting the standard which they did effectively for six
more years while hundreds burned. Financially, it turned
out to be a good decision has paid out many less millions
of dollars in product liability costs and settlements
than they would have re-tooling their factories (Dowie,
1978).
The interactions between Ford and the NHTSA regarding the imple
mentation of standards and the testing procedures specified by the
proposed standard are not unique to Ford.

The procedures required

for implementation of standards requires that response by the in
dustry and the general public be invited.

Other automobile manufac

turers also have argued against the standards testing procedures.
The

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety reports that most of the

comments come from the auto industry ("Virtual Halt," 1976).

The

fervor with which Ford engaged in negotiations with NHTSA over the
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provision of data and the procedures for implementing standard 301
may be related to the corporate organizational structure and the
tendency for corporate policies to be congruent with the opinions
of Henry Ford II.

According to Colman McCarthy, Ford has been

adamantly opposed to safety (and environmental protection) standards.
For three decades, he had a record of resistance and
contempt for safety and environmental proposals...Ford
sneered about ’self-appointed consumer advocates,’ as
if it were unfair that the public should be told about
the fiery Pintos or that federal regulators should
dare order him to clean up his fumey cars...Asked by
Look Magazine in 1968 for the biggest problem of the
Ford Motor Co., he said, ’that's easy, making more
money' (McCarthy, 1979).

Alleviation of Negative Consequences of Control Processes

The advantages of Ford in defending itself against the applica
tion of criminal liability in the judicial system are indications of
the importance of Ford's organizational structure in attempts to avoid
potentially damaging control processes.

The advantage of the corpo

rate organization take a number of forms.
1.

Corporations have a unique advantage as defendents in that

they are able to control the image they present as principals in the
trial process.

Ford, for example, presented as representatives of

the corporation witnesses who appeared sincere and respectable.
Harold MacDonald, who served as a witness for the defense, who this
year is president of the Society of American Engineers, and whose
major interests center on home, church, and jogging, is an excellent
example of this kind of image manipulation.

Because there is a

choice concerning which officials may represent the corporation in
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court, the corporation may put its best symbolic foot forward.
2.

The influence of corporations over the mass media also

serves to inhibit the application of negative consequences of the
control process.

Soon after the trial commenced, favorable stories

concerning the Pinto surfaced in the press.

One such incident in

cluded a picture of a severely damaged Pinto that had been driven
off a bridge.

The accompanying story, in effect, asked if Pintos

should be expected to take that kind of abuse.

Some three weeks

into the trial, a popular television series showed a Ford Pinto
being impacted from the rear without the consequences being examined
in the trial.

The reactions of the media to the Pinto case are

examined later for their influences on official actions.

These in

cidences are indications of the abilities o'f the giant corporations
to use the media to forestall or diminish reaction.

While admoni

tions to the jury, at least ideally, serve to keep the influence of
such tactics from the judicial process, the attempts to influence
public opinion seem clear.
3.

The social standing of the corporate defendent also serves

its interests.

The social standing of the judge and representatives

of the defendent are likely to be similar.

Judges are often deferen

tial to business defendents and may be antagonistic to those who
prosecute business crime.

In fact, Mark Green et al. (1979) report,

"...it is best to find the judge's friend or law partner to defend an
anti-trust client" (p. 543).

The Pinto case was no exception to this

practice of corporate defendents.

A former associate of the judge

was hired as part of the Ford defense team.
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4.

The resources of the corporate defendent are likely to shield

it from the full effects of the criminal law.

The ability to hire

the best lawyers, to present professional exhibits, to utilize a na
tional team in its defense is particularly indicative of the power
of corporations to effectively neutralize the powers of controlling
organizations.

Perhaps most indicative of Ford's control over the

trial processes was its access to trial transcripts on an hourly
basis.

The advantages this provided for Ford in the argument of mo

tions and the examination of witnesses is an instance of the transla
tion of economic power over corporations into political power.

The

financial resources of the corporation allowed differential influence
over the processes of control utilized in the case.
5.

The difficulty of setting standards of conduct for large

corporations decreases the effectiveness of control of corporate
power through the application of criminal liability.

The judge in

the Pinto case ruled that the jury could set its own standards for
the Ford Motor Company.

Nevertheless, Ford argued throughout the

trial that at the time the Pinto was manufactured it met all federal
standards for fuel tank integrity.

The technical problems involved

in standard setting, the necessity of relying on information from the
industry for the setting of standards, and the distinction between
standards for product performance versus those of industry perform
ance in. response to discovery of a defect work to compound the
problems of standard setting.
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The Influence of Other State Organizations

The influence of other state organizations on the functioning
of the NHTSA may or may not be protective of the auto industry’s in
terests.

As discussed earlier, the RECAT report seems to have been

designed to lessen federal commitment to regulatory objectives.

Si

milarly, the decision by Secretary Goldschmidt not to recall automo
biles with transmissions determined by the NHTSA to have a safety
defect is clearly in the interest of automobile manufacturers.

Con

gressional subcommittee actions to force the imposition are not.
Congressional actions may, however, be an indication of the effec
tiveness of industry lobbying on the rule-making activities of the
regulatory organization.
That the industry had some effect on the production of the RECAT
report through its influence with the White House is supported by a
number of factors.

As previously discussed, the temporal proximity

of the visit by Ford executives to the Nixon White House, the produc
tion of the RECAT report and the court procedures on the airbag sup
port this contention.

A second indication is a 1971 memo concerning

the origins of the RECAT report which references one document which
"sets out the statement of White House concern for the air bag and
other regulatory burdens on the auto industry (Lowell, 1971, p. 1),
and another which "lists the members of the RECAT committee.

These

members have all been phoned by our contact [anonymous], and even
thought two of them were known to the contact and had been helpful
to him on previous occasions, they ’froze’ when asked about RECAT,
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as did the others phoned" (Lovell, 1971, p. 1).

A third indication

is the $133,441 contributed by the Ford Motor Company to the 1972
Nixon presidential campaign.

This is particularly noteworthy since

Henry Ford II donated nearly $50,000 of that fund himself despite
his history of supporting democratic candidates.

The tendence of

Henry Ford II to support democratic candidates is confirmed by
Gerald Ford in comments reported in the Detroit Free Press (Ford,
1979).
White House influence on auto regulation is not limited to the
RECAT report.

Evidence of White House influence on NHTSA regula

tions and Ford influence on the White House is provided in a 1974
memo to John Moss, Chair of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance.
I [Special counsel Michael Lemov] spoke with a highranking official of the Department of Transportation
on May 22, 1974, to determine the basis for inclusion
of the ignition interlock requirement in DOT regula
tions.
I was advised by this official that he had personal
knowledge that the White House had ordered the Depart
ment of Transportation to require the ignition inter
lock in 1974 automobiles. This White House order, I
was told, followed a conference by Henry Ford, II, on
behalf of Ford Motor Company and White House officials.
Ford urged that the requirement be included in the
standard...
Toms [Douglas Toms, former administrator of NHTSA]
said the interlock arose out of a dispute between
General Motors and Ford over safety standards. GM
favored the air bag. Edward Cole, President of
General Motors, spoke with Toms and Volpe (Secretary
of DOT) about it during a trip to Detroit sometime in
1970 or 1971. Volpe was impressed with GM's progress.
Toms said this 'angered’ Henry Ford because Ford had
rejected the air bag idea. Toms said it is specula
tive, but he was told by people in Detroit that Henry
Ford went to Gerstenberg of GM to complain about Cole's
endorsement of the air bag to Volpe. Toms then said
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that Henry Ford and Lynn Townsend of Chrysler went
directly to the President about the air bag and perhaps
alternatives. Subsequently (probably 1971), there was
a meeting at the Department of Transportation with
White House 'super heavy weights' present...Toms said
after the meeting Volpe retired with the White House
staff and later told Toms, 'We are in trouble on the air
bag.'
Toms said this was just before the 1972 campaign and
there was talk of Henry Ford switching from the Demo
crats and that he might play a role on behalf of
Nixon’s election. Toms said out of tnat meeting and ef
fort came the interlock as an alternative to the air bag.
It was at this time that Ford began a national adver
tising and television campaign suggesting the interlock
as an alternative to the air bag. Shortly thereafter,
Standard 208 was amended to include the interlock
as an interim step to the air bag (Lemov, 1974, p. 1) •

Corporations and the Economy

Research question 5 addresses the relationship between economic
factors and promulgation of regulation.
Does the legitimacy of controllers ebb and flow with the
business cycle?
Examination of the relationship between regulation and the
strength of the economy permits attention to the effect of limited
resources on state regulatory policies.

Ray Pagan, Vice-President

for Castle and Cooke, Inc., a multi-national agri-business corpora
tion with 40,000 employees, on a recent edition of the MacNeil-Lehrer
Report was asked his reaction to proposed legislation to curb corpo
rate powers.
I think it's a redundant anachronism, and I will explain
why. I feel there is enough regulation already.- The
corporation is really hampered. There are many institu
tions within our system of government to make the corpo
ration accountable, and this bill misses the two key
issues of the '80s, national defense and productivity.
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At a time when the nation needs a shot in the arm, the
economy of the nation, a proposal of this nature is
really counterproductive ("Corporate Responsibility,"
1980).
On a later edition of the MacNeil-Lehrer Report Secretary
Goldschmidt expressed similar considerations, but tempored by safety
considerations.
MacNeil: Mr. Secretary, you say it's necessary in
this country for government and the auto industry and
unions to rework their working relationships. In that
context, why did the government and your department re
cently not order a recall on more than 20 million Ford
cars with transmissions that could slip out of gear, and
had been implicated in, I understand, a number of ac
cidents, including more than 90 that had fatal results?
Sec. Goldschmidt: Well, I'm not sure that I understand
the question in the context of the preface, that is —
MacNeil: Is that one way of implementing a new rela
tionship between government and the auto industry?
Sec. Goldschmidt: Oh, I see. I'm sorry. No. I think
not. I think only in the manner in which we conduct our
business can we help the relationship there. Our de
partment has the responsibility to carry out the law;
that is, if we believe that a physical recall of the cars
is necessary, we have to demand it. If we believe some
other solution is acceptable— the Pinto case, other cases
have been up before— we can do that. The cases involve
five transmissions, if my memory is correct, and the
circumstances split them into two categories, but the
practical consequences of it are: it's a choice between
bringing 16 million automobiles back, and finding some
other way to handle the problem that meets the public
objective which is, we should not have the consumer un
aware of dangers that are threatening them, and we should
make it clear that there are solutions to the problem
that can be used, and we tried to do that.
MacNeil: But in the new economic climate, did.Ford's
position weigh more heavily in the sort of moral scales
than it would have a few years ago?
Sec. Goldschmidt: Well, I wish I could tell .you for
sure I know the answer to that. I agonized over that
case for quite a while. I think the way I would answer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is this: I tried to discount their financial condition
and just look at the impact of what we were trying to
do vis-a-vis other recalls, and to look at whether or
not the alternatives which we had in front of us were
acceptable.
MacNeil: Well, as a matter of policy, is the financial
condition of the automobile companies— given all the
circumstances you just got through reciting [the finan
cial problems of Chrysler and the auto industry as a
whole]— now given priority over public safety?
Sec. Goldschmidt: No. I think that's not a good idea.
First, Congress has written that law independent of any
of the considerations that I have...We have from the
company essentially an agreement to do certain things
that we think are in the public's interest, and I would
leave it there. I think you can make a case for a
recall— it was made: that is, to bring 16 million vehi
cles, or whatever that number was, back into shops and
to change transmissions and so on. My judgment was
that wasn't prudent.
Lehrer:

Not prudent or too expensive?

Sec. Goldschmidt: Well, I think it's not prudent for
the government to order it done. I think that the cost
of the solution in relation to the statute is a factor
that we have a right to take a look at, and did
("Goldschmidt Interview," 1981).
The practical effects of economic considerations on automobile
regulation are felt most strongly in the advocacy of the federal go
vernment of cost/benefit analysis as a decision-making tool.

The

requirements of the Office of Management and Budget for proposed
rule-making explicitly include:
a comparison of the expected benefits or accomplish
ments and the costs (Federal and non-Federal) associated
with the alternatives considered (Heffelfinger, 1971).
The NHTSA is less than enthusiastic about indiscriminate use of cost/
benefit analysis, a position supported by the Oversight Subcommittee.
But this [federal advocacy of cost/benefit analysis of
regulations] contradicts the Congressional intent, the
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subcommittee said, that the Secretary of Transportation,
in issuing motor vehicle safety standards through
NHTSA, be 'left to exercise his judgment in the applica
tion of a broad calculus of safety benefits, with a
built-in bias toward standards which meet the need for
motor vehicle safety.' Moreover, it said, benefit-cost
analysis is 'least defensible as a prerequisite to
health and safety rulemaking, where benefits are diffi
cult to quantify. Its advocacy by executive bureaus
is improper when Congress, explicitly or implicitly, has
stated that benefit-cost analysis should not be required
before issuing a regulation.'
The subcommittee proposed 'guidelines for NHTSA in
applying the benefit-cost device,' including:
'Until benefit-cost studies can be based on acceptable
data, NHTSA should accord little or no weight to them
in agency rulemaking. At the same time, NHTSA should
press— with even more intensity than in the past— its
efforts to develop a data base which will make reasona
ble, adequate benefit-cost studies possible. Before
this is accomplished, the Department of Transportation,
the Council on Wage and Price Stability, and others
should be held to the limits of statutory law and
prevented from imposing unreasonable requirements on
NHTSA" ("Virtual Halt," 1976).
The utilization of cost/benefit analysis by auto companies and
agencies of the federal government continues, but not necessarily
with the sensitivity expressed by the comments of the subcommittee.
While cost/benefit analysis may promote some degree of objectivity
in decision-making, the problems of quantifying costs and benefits,
especially in the area of safety, lessens its utility.

The emphasis

on cost/benefit analysis within the federal government indicates
explicit recognition of the costs of regulation and the relation be
tween economic resources and state responses to societal problems.
In research question 6, the impact of the public on regulatory
decision-making is addressed.
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What are the influences of non-elites on the substance
and application of the law?

Non-Corporate Actors and Controls

Prominent groups having an interest in the rule-making and rule
enforcing activities of NHTSA include the Center for Auto Safety, the
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Physicians'for Automobile
Safety, the National Safety Council, and the Automotive Safety Founda
tion.

These groups represent various points of view on automobile

regulation.

Opposing orientations may be represented by the Center

for Auto Safety and the Automotive Safety Foundation.

The CAS "works

to help consumers broadly rather than on an individual basis.

For

example, the Center works for recalls and extended warrantees that
include a large class of vehicle owners, to establish new consumer
law in landmark cases, and to publish books and manuals that enable
consumers to help themselves" ("History of Accomplishments," 1979).
The Automotive Safety Foundation represents a variety of industry
groups.

"In the areas of traffic management arid engineering and in

the adoption of state standards, the ASF may play an important but
informal role in decision-making by providing counsel and information
to key people at key times" (Havelock, 1971, p. 143).

In a study of

researchers and decision-makers in the area of automotive safety,
Havelock found "General agreement...that two groups held the most
power:

the federal government and the auto industry.

Exception

of respondents from the auto industry, itself, most also thought
that the industry still had too much power while the government had
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too little...In contrast to these two giants, the safety establish
ment groups, the professions, the universities and the local go
vernments were far down the list in judged influence" (1971, p. 155).
The data collected in this study do not allow a more recent evalua
tion of the collective or individual effects of public or special
interest groups on safety standards.
The activities of the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis
tration themselves represent a major force in the promulgation of
rule-making and rule enforcement.

While the criticisms levied

against the NHTSA cast doubt on the effectiveness of NHTSA in re
presenting the public interest, NHTSA is the source of over 50
federal rules regarding auto safety ("Summary Description," 1976).
The procedures established for NHTSA’s operations allow for the in
put of information from interested parties.

In addition, NHTSA col

lects and generates technical information appropriate for the con
duct of its duties.
examples.

Crash tests and accident statistics are major

In the Pinto case, the initial finding of a defect in Hay,

1978, was a major factor in the Ford Motor Company recall of the
Pinto and Bobcat automobiles.
Juries in civil cases have also constituted an effective force
in the application of safety standards.

The award of $128.5 million

to Richard Grimshaw by the jury in his civil case against the Ford
Motor Company is an example of the desire of the jury to be an ef
fective force in the control of corporations.
'We came up with this high amount so that Ford wouldn't
design cars this way again,' says foreman Quinn, who
describes the Pinto as 'a lousy and unsafe product.'
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The jury, he says, wanted a punishment severe enough
to sting the big auto maker...Plaintiff's attorneys
had asked for a punitive award of $100 million, the
amount they estimated Ford saved by retaining the
allegedly defective design on Pintos and other smallcar models from the time they were introduced until the
federally mandated standards took effect on 1977 cars...
Mr. Greene [a juror]...recalls bringing up the $125
million figure himself. He reasoned that if Ford saved
$100 million by not installing safe tanks, an award
matching that wouldn't really be punitive. So he added
"25 million...Some of the jurors themselves concede that
their verdict is likely to be pruned back, but they
still feel that it was the proper one and that it was
dictated by the evidence. 'We wanted Ford to take no
tice,' foreman Quinn says. 'I think they've noticed'
(Harris, 1977, p. 12). ■
The standard setting powers of the jury in the Ford Pinto criminal
trial in Indiana were affirmed in the judge's ruling on a motion by
the defense to exclude from admission evidence proffered by the state
that the acceptable standard may be higher than the 30 mph stand
ard set by the NHTSA.

James Neal defended this motion, offering

the following arguments.
1.

If federal standards, once set, can be changed by the jury,

the prosecutions of manufacturers is likely to result in the total
destruction of the auto industry.

Individual prosecutors could

harass industry to the point where it cannot function.
2.

Federal standards are established criteria for practica

bility, are based on objective criteria, and meet the needs of auto
safety.
3.

Detailed procedures for testing are established by NHTSA.

4.

Engineers cannot design for vague standards [for example,

those set by jurors] (State of Indiana vs. Ford, 1980).
Media treatment of the Ford Motor Company manufacturer of the
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defective Pinto was especially vitriolic.

Although many papers

relied on the major newswires for summaries of information, the
various civil actions prompted others (most notably, perhaps, the
Detroit Free Press) to provide detailed accounts and background in
formation of the case.

According to an article in the Columbia

Journalism Review, network news programs also varied in their
coverage, with ABC providing the most extensive analysis ("The
Pinto Story," 1978).

The Pinto trial received extensive coverage

and generated unfavorable publicity for Ford.

Correspondents from

the major networks, the Detroit newspapers, and the major wire
services were in continuous attendence at the Pinto trial proceed
ings.

The impact of the 1977 article in Mother Jones on govern

mental actions has already been cited.

The general influence of the

media of the implementation and application of standards is unclear.
The market competition of the auto industry makes it particularly
susceptible to unfavorable publicity and the public nature of NHTSA
activities makes it vulnerable to attacks in the media.

It is im

possible to determine, however, the specific effects of media treat
ment on either industry or regulatory actions.

The impact of in

terested citizens on standard setting and application is equally
difficult to determine.

The perception that individual inputs are

likely to be ineffective is expressed by Edwin E. Lawrence, who cor
responded with NHTSA about the fuel system in Ford Torinos.
Your attention is directed to the enclosure from the
SAE Journal of July, 1969, relating to the hideous deaths
of my friends Bill and Beryl Robinson. It took five
minutes for them to die from the effects of being burned
to death as a result of the defective design of Ford
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Motor Company. Their screams for help went unanswered
because of heat from the flaming 1968 Torino kept res
cuers from them.
Should your office and the other responsible authori
ties in the Federal government fail to take action by
January 1, 1971 to see that this defective design is
corrected, and the approximately ten million vehicles
involved modified to protect the public, I am going to
file appropriate suits to force the issue. In addition,
I will transport the burned out hulk of the Robinson
1968 Torino to Washington, along with the ash remains of
Bill and Beryl Robinson, and hold my own little demonstra
tion in front of your office.
I hope that this will not be necessary. I don't have
the resources of Ford Motor Company to influence go
vernmental action— but, I do have the ability to focus
public attention upon these tragic deaths in the hope
of helping to stop the almost daily toll of motorists
being cremated on the roads of our country by FORD Motor
Company's defective gas tanks (Lawrence, 1970).

Reciprocal Relations

Research questions 7 and 8 address the benefits to automobile com
panies of regulation of their industry.
Do controls increase the powers of corporations?
Have .the efforts of large corporations been aided by
the decisions and non-decisions of controllers?
In the discussion of research question 6, the arguments presented
against standard setting by juries provide evidence of the predicta
bility desired by large corporations in their environments.
controls provide that predictability.

Federal

The differential impact of

federal regulations on small and large firms and procedures for test
ing are not completely mitigated by the statutory provision for
exemption from application of standards "where fewer than 10,000
vehicles per year are produced and compliance would subject him [the
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small manufacturer] to substantial financial hardships" ("Federal
Motor," 1974).

Furthermore, American Motors argues that the am

biguity with which standards are implemented (in large part a result
of delaying tactics of the larger companies) constitutes a special
hardship for small manufacturers.
American Motors believes this NHTSA philosophy regard
ing lead time is unreasonable and impracticable. In
addition to violating the intent of the Administrative
rulemaking process, it suggests that the Administration
expects the automobile industry to initiate active pro
duction engineering programs each time a notice of pro
posed rulemaking is issued. The original proposed amend
ments [of 301] were also issued in 1970. Three years
elapsed between the initial proposal and the issuance
of an initial amendment. More than one additional
year expired before all amendments and responses to
petitions had been published. These final amendments
made in response to petitions for reconsideration were
promulgated only ten months prior to their effective
date.
The history of the proposed amendments to FMVSS 201, 203,
204, and the amendments to FMVSS 301 illustrates, the
cloud of uncertainty which surrounds every new proposal
at its issuance. This uncertainty makes it impossible
for one to forecast from a proposal the specifics of
any final ruling which may be issued. Recognition of
this impossibility is also recognition of the im
practicability of reacting to all NHTSA proposals with
production engineering programs (Stewart, 1975).
The competitive advantage of large firms as a result of NHTSA pro
posals and procedures which place extraordinary burdens on small
manufacturers by virtue of their lesser resources is clear from the
American Motor presentation.

Although regulation results in some

costs to all members of the industry, the greater costs, as per
centage of total resources, to smaller firms must be recognized.
Arguments for exemptions based on discriminatory effects have
occasionally indicated the creativity that federal regulation may
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elicit from members of the industry.

In 1975, "Triumph Motors ob

jected to the use of a 4,000 pound barrier during the moving bar
rier impacts, asserting that such large barriers discriminate against
small vehicles...The NHTSA has concluded that no justification exists
for this change...since vehicles in use are often over 4,000 pounds
in weight and a small vehicle is as likely to collide with a vehicle
that size as one smaller" ("Federal Motor," 1974).
An example of the reciprocal relations between NHTSA and the
Ford Motor Company is demonstrated by the negotiations between the
two organizations.

As reported in the Wall Street Journal,

On the basis of the two meetings [between Ford and
NHTSA], the safety officials deduced that Ford was
willing to recall the Pintos and that it wanted to do
so before a public hearing could generate additional
damaging publicity.
Also, Ford clearly sought the agency's backing for
remedies it proposed: installation of a plastic
shield to protect the gas tank and of a longer filler
pipe. The company, which had made fuel-tank improve
ments in its 1977 Pintos, also wanted assurance that
it wouldn't have to make every one of those improve- •
ments in its earlier models (Karr & Apcar, 1978).
That Ford did not have to make all of those improvements is substan
tiated in the recall letter to owners of Ford Pintos and Mercury
Bobcats.

"Although the modifications will not make the earlier-model

cars equal to the 1977 and later models in meeting the Federal stand
ard..." (Geoffrey, 1978). .The NHTSA was adamant, however, that the
modifications of the fuel system meet performance criteria in crash
tests.

During the trial Ford presented evidence of its cooperation

with the NHTSA during the development of the modifications (to rebut
prosecution charges of its recklessness). Interviews with the ad
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ministrator of NHTSA and correspondence between Ford and NHTSA during
this time cast some doubt on the extent to which cooperation actually
existed.

Corporations and Their Responsibilities

The dependence of Ford on criteria established by the legal
system for definition of its social responsibilities is indicated by
a number of factors and statements in Ford's defense of the Pinto.
That laxity in this area is generic to the entire industry under
lies the position of a Detroit News article.
But this is a cost-conscious industry and it rarely
moves on safety matters until pushed firmly by govern
ment, public opinion or disaster ("Both U.S., Ford,"
1978).
This laxity is perhaps best illustrated by Ford's reticence to utilize
the safest fuel system available (despite its leadership in their
development), regardless of the applicability of federal safety stand
ards and the years they became effective.
While automobiles that meet the requirements of the
revised version of FMYSS 301 offer substantially more
protection in collisions than those sold before the
standard came into effect, the fuel systems still do
not meet the state of the art.
Automobile researchers have demonstrated that fuel sys
tems can be much better designed without any great in
crease in cost. However, few of their suggestions have
been implemented by the automobile manufacturers ("FuelFed," 1978).
This position is specifically applied to the Ford Pinto by Mark
Dowie when he says, "Ford admits that the plastic baffle in question
could have been placed on the car in 1974.. Well, why wasn't it?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128
Because the baffle was designed to meet a standard, not to save
lives, and there wasn't a standard in 1974.

It didn't become effec

tive until the 1977 model year and that's when the device was placed
on the car" ("Pintos, Bobcats," 1978).
The Center for Auto Safety concurs with Dowie's presentation
of the situation.
In 1974, Ford began testing a high density plastic
shield on the front of the gas tank. In their crash
tests, they found this shield to be effective in the
maj ority of cases...This plastic shield which costs about
a dollar was not installed on Pintos until the 1977
model year when passenger automobiles were required to
pass a rear end impact test (Ditlow & Hubbard, 1977).
That Ford not only depends on the law for definition of its corpo
rate responsibilities but is prone to utilize a narrow interpreta
tion of the intent of the law is indicated by statements made by
Herbert Mifch, Vice-President for Environmental and Safety Engineer. ing for the Ford Motor Company.
Ford recommended on March 18, 1968, early adoption of
a Federal fuel-integrity standard incorporating rearmoving barrier impact requirements at 20 miles per hour,
and reiterated to the government its support for such a
stand on two other occasions during the next two and a
half years (Misch, 1977).
What this statement does not reveal is that Ford's support of this
standard was motivated, in part, by the desirability of this stand
ard over more stringent ones.

A similar instance of Ford support of

less stringent standards to avoid more effective ones is Ford's
advocacy of the ignition interlock system to ward off the imposition
of air bag standards on the industry.

There is evidence that the

Ford Motor Company interprets its responsibilities more broadly
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than is suggested by these comments.

In September, 1978, Henry Ford

II commented, "The lawyers would shoot me for saying this, but I
think there's some cause for concern about the car [Pinto].

I don't

even listen to the cost figures— we've got to fix it" ("Henry Ford
Admits," 1978).’ A major defense utilized by Ford in the criminal
case, however, was that Pintos are as safe as other small cars manu
factured by the industry, thus abdicating responsibility for negative
consequences of use of their product.

Theoretical Implications of the Data

The data collected in this study provide no basis for testing
of the theoretical relationships proposed in Chapter II.

These data

do, however, permit the researcher to address the issues raised with
in the case study presented by the attempts to control the Ford
Motor Company by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
and processes of criminal prosecution.

The information presented in

this study may be applicable to other corporate and controlling or
ganizations, but the research design prohibits such generalizations.
Whether the information generated by this case accurately represents
the activities and value positions of the NHTSA and Ford generally
is also open to question.

As previously stated, the highly public

nature of the Pinto case resulted in special pressure on the acting
organizations to maintain the bases for their legitimacy.

In the

case of Ford, the corporate organization put special emphasis on
objective criteria by which its moral legitimacy could be established.
The resulting dependence on the formal rationality of the law, while
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contributing to the narrow conception of justice criticized by
Quinney, can be more easily understood in light of the threat to
the corporation's legitimacy.

In the case of NHTSA, the effective

ness of the controlling organization and, hence, its functional le
gitimacy was particularly subject to scrutiny.

Had this case not

achieved such notoriety, the activities of NHTSA and its interactions
with Ford might have been qualitatively different.

A final caution

in the interpretation of the data presented here stems from the re
lated problems of selective deposit and selective survival of the
documents utilized in the study.

A major threat to the validity

of the conclusions generated by the data is the protection of infor
mation by controlling organizations.

As discussed previously, data

may be kept out of the public domain if it threatnes the corporate
actor's competitive position or is deemed non-essential to the
public's right to know.

The data, as well as the extent to which

the research questions may be addressed, are necessarily limited by
these factors.

There are, however, a number of conclusions within

the present study that may be highlighted.

The Ambiguous Relationship Between the State and Corporations

While the corporation is not beyond the control of the state, as
evidenced by the efforts expended by Ford to meet or subvert the ex
pectations of NHTSA, the form of the mutual influence of Ford and
NHTSA is a promising area of study.

Structural and bureaucratic

characteristics of the relationship between Ford and NHTSA and the
respective actors are addressed in this study.

The forces having an
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impact on the functioning of the NHTSA and the corporate attempts
to influence those forces are also included in the delineation of
the form of mutual influence between the corporate organization and
the controlling organization.

A contributing factor to the ambiguity

of the relationship between the state and corporations is the alleg
iance of the controlling organization to the public interest versus
its allegiance to the industry it is mandated to control.

This

problem is compounded by the conflicting allegiances of other or-,
ganizations in the state machinery.

Structural and Bureaucratic Characteristics

Characteristic of the process of interaction between controlling
and corporate organizations is the sensitivity of the control pro
cesses to the economic situation of the actor to be controlled.
Secretary Goldschmidt revealed the specific awareness of governmental
actors of the need to consider the finite financial resources within
the society.

This awareness is particularly reflected in corporate

arguments based on the costs of meeting governmental regulations.
The limitations on the investments of corporations to meet the
responsibilities imposed by governmental regulations and, more broad
ly, the requirements of social responsibility are structural impedi
ments to the process of social control.
Bureaucratic characteristics of corporate and controlling orga
nizations that impede the process of corporate control also contribute
to the ambiguous relationship between the state and the corporation.
The more clearly specified goals of the corporation, the greater
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concentration of resources within the corporate form, and the con
tributing responsibilities of the state to the ideological legiti
macy of the corporate form are important in the advantages of.the
corporation in its interactions with the government.

Conversely,

the variety of the demands on the controlling actor and its re
sources result in often conflicting influences on the process of so
cial control.

That the corporation, with its extraordinary powers,

is able to dominate among these conflicting influences is supported
in this research.

That the process of corporate domination over so

cial control processes stems as much from constrictions on the per
formance of control structures as from the inordinate powers of cor
porations is also evidenced by the data in this study.

This may be

especially true of controlling organizations for the automobile in
dustry since supportive controlling forces (for example, labor unions
and competition) are not particularly effective or are likely to be
effective only on a sporadic basis.

Politicization of Controlling Organizations

The policy-making functions of the NHTSA makes it an inherently
political organization.

While the analytic influences on NHTSA

decision-making are evidenced by attempts to establish objective
criteria, to devise appropriate testing procedures for measurement
of corporate abilities to meet the criteria established, and to con
struct a data base on automotive and traffic safety, the political
inputs into the decision-making processes are evidenced by interven
tion of the President into the air bag controversy as well as by the
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letter to NHTSA from Edwin Lawrence.

The analytic basis for rule-

making is dependent upon the particular area of expertise commanded
by NHTSA, thus accounting for the bureaucratic influences on the con
tent of the law.

The political basis is more obscure.

A major cri

ticism of the regulatory process in the literature is the delegation
of legislative authority to the administrative bodies.

The overt

recognition and acceptance of NHTSA rule-making powers in the data
gathered in this study would seem to neutralize this objection in
the literature, except that the executive influences, through the De
partment of Transportation and through general policies for adminis
trative bodies on NHTSA decision-making far exceed those of the
legislative branch.

This situation is especially disconcerting in

light -of the fact that, at least in the information available for
this study, the executive actors tended to impede regulatory efforts
while legislative actors sought to encourage it.

The Allegiances of Controlling Organizations

The beneficiaries of NHTSA compete for its allegiance.

The

public, the primary beneficiary of the NHTSA, is at a disadvantage
given the accomodative relationships that exist between the control
ling and corporate organizations.

The more organized attempts to

focus the decision-making processes of the NHTSA on the public in
terest are epitomized by the Center for Auto Safety.

Its effective

ness is, however, mitigated by the greater-resources and more di
rected efforts of the automobile companies.

In an interview with

Joan Claybrook, former administrator of NHTSA, it was learned that
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Ford lobbyists are in almost constant contact with NHTSA personnel.
In this particular case, the strengths and resources of the lobbying
efforts appear to supersede the structure of beneficiaries proposed
by Ermaim and Lundman.

This conclusion is somewhat compromised by

the conflict among automotive companies in their regulatory interests.

Conflict Within the Dominant and Non-Dominant Classes

Conflict within the dominant and non-dominant classes supports
the conception of the state as an actor independent, to some extent,
of the economic actors in the society.

Although there is much evi

dence of the influence of economic elites on NHTSA's policy-making
procedures, conflict between the large and small corporations indi
cates some measure of independence for the state.

The provision

within the procedures of NHTSA for exemptions to its requirements
for small companies supports the conflict between the large and small
manufacturers and, at least ideally, the competitive forces in the
automobile industry.

That NHTSA's provisions are relatively inef

fective for these purposes is evidenced by the fact that exemptions
are ruled upon individually by NHTSA, requiring disclosure of finan
cial information, by the letter from'American Motors which argues
that the practical schedule for rule-making puts smaller companies
at a disadvantage in that they do not have the resources to prepare
for all contingencies, and by the requirement that the production of
the companies eligible for the exemptions be less than 10,000 units
annually.

The issue of conflict in the .non-dominant class was not

specifically addressed in the data collection efforts of this study.
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The conflicting positions of regulatory bodies on the feasibility
of cost/benefit analysis is an example provided by this study that
is supportive of this issue.

The Enforcement of Policy

The promulgation and enforcement of the National Traffic and Mo
tor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 are two separate, but related, issues.
Criminal penalties for non-compliance are not provided by this act,
an important pragmatic consideration in the achievement of the stand
ard.

The level of organization of the actors to be controlled is

one factor proposed by Spitzer in the immunity of some societal actors
to social control efforts.

The organizational effectiveness of au

tomobile companies is indicated by the activities of the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association and the promotion of standards and
standard enforcement by the Society of Automotive Engineers on be
half of the automobile companies.
A second factor proposed by Spitzer is the availability of non
official control structures.

The organization of labor unions pro

vides a non-official control structure for the automobile industry.
Official structures also vary in the severity of their responses.
The NHTSA, as revealed by the information presented in this chapter,
represents a less severe response than criminal penalties, demo
cratization, or nationalization and a more severe response than self
regulation.

Because the NHTSA has been established as a response to

corporate power, more severe control structures are unlikely to be
utilized.

The essential position of corporations in the economic
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institution of society is reflected in the comment by Ray Pagan o.n
the importance of productivity in the 1980s.

The perceived utility

of the corporation is reflected by the concern with the costs of
regulation to corporations.

The action by the jury in the Grimshaw

case argues against the proposed effects of this factor.

Despite

the major role played by the Ford Motor Company in the economy and
the attempts to protect the company's image, the jury levied a puni
tive sanction against the corporation.

Comments by two members of

the jury, cited in this chapter, indicate that the absence of more
severe criminal sanctions for corporate organizations may have been
a consideration.

If indeed this is the case, the automobile corpo

rations may have protected their own interests from official action
to a degree that invites more severe unofficial action.

Conclusion

Research into the effective control of corporate powers is en
hanced by the descriptive data afforded by the Pinto case.

The rela

tive ineffectiveness of control mechanisms within the present system
of relations between corporations and the state is demonstrated by
the data gathered in this study.

This research reveals the utility

of the organizational conception of the corporation, the importance
of organizational features in control processes, and that the role
of the state is more complex than is conveyed in much of the litera
ture on the control of corporations.

Further research, both qualita

tive and quantitative, is necessary for a more generalized under
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standing of the control of corporations and more effective implementa
tion of control mechanisms.
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